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Article

The Paradox of Exclusive State-Court
Jurisdiction Over Federal Claims
Thomas B. Bennett†
INTRODUCTION
Say you buy groceries with a credit card. When you look at the
receipt, you notice that the store has included your entire credit card
number on it. You start to worry about the potential for credit card
fraud or identity theft after you throw it away. Surely there is a law
prohibiting receipts that so easily facilitate information-privacy
crimes, you think to yourself. So you decide to speak with a lawyer.
First, the good news: not only did Congress pass a law outlawing receipts with full credit card numbers,1 it authorized you to sue the grocery store directly.2 If you win, you will receive statutory damages of
between $100 and $1,000, plus your attorney’s fees.3 And your case is
very strong. If it were to reach the merits, you would be all but certain
to win. For that reason, the attorney is willing to represent you on a
contingency basis, perhaps even as part of a class action.
Now the bad news: despite the existence of federal law regulating
credit card receipts through a private right of action, you are barred
† Furman Academic Fellow, NYU School of Law. B.A. Swarthmore College; J.D.
NYU School of Law. For helpful comments, suggestions, and feedback, I am grateful to
Kirti Datla, Barry Friedman, Helen Hershkoff, Sam Issacharoff, Troy McKenzie, Erin
Murphy, Burt Neuborne, David Noll, Rick Pildes, Hon. Albert M. Rosenblatt, Jonathan
Siegel, Steve Vladeck, and participants at the Eleventh Annual Junior Faculty Federal
Courts Workshop and the Fifth Annual Civil Procedure Workshop. Thanks to the editors of the Minnesota Law Review in general, and Will Wright, Sarah Nelson, and Abby
Oakland in particular, for thoughtful editing. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to
Randall Johnston for her wise insight and unflagging support. Copyright © 2021 by
Thomas B. Bennett.
1. See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159,
117 Stat. 1952 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (“[N]o person that accepts credit cards or debit
cards for the transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card
number or the expiration date upon any receipt . . . .”).
3. Id. § 1681n(a).
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from bringing your suit in federal court by standing doctrine.4 And it
gets worse: it is unclear whether you can even sue in state court. In
some states, you can, but in other states, you cannot. Because of where
you live (and thus where you bought your groceries), it may be impossible for you ever to recover the money to which the law entitles you.
In short, Congress said you could sue, federal courts said you couldn’t,
and state courts are divided.
This is a paradox. The classic model assumes that federal law
should be decided mainly in federal court, or at least that federal
courts have an important role to play in the adjudication of federal
claims.5 So how can there be a federal right, duly created by Congress,
the remedy for which lies exclusively in (some) state courts? This Article unravels that paradox, which applies to a large and growing number of federal statutory claims covering not only data privacy but also
a broad range of areas including consumer financial regulation, telemarketing, and employment law.
The paradox derives from three related but distinct features of
our federated court system. First, the Supreme Court recently adopted
a sharpened concreteness requirement for proving the injury-in-fact
prong of Article III standing, which bars a persistent and predictable
subset of federal claims from being brought in federal court.6 Second,
state courts are presumed to have jurisdiction to entertain federal
claims and indeed have an affirmative duty to hear them if they hear
analogous state-law claims.7 Third, unbound by the strictures of Article III’s standing requirements, state courts have fashioned their own
4. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“[A] bare procedural
violation, divorced from any concrete harm, [cannot] satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.”).
5. See, e.g., Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019) (reversing prior
holding because it made the statutory “guarantee of a federal forum ring[] hollow”
where, in practice, plaintiffs were forced to litigate federal claims in state court); see
also Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between
Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1236–41 (2004) (collecting authority).
6. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548–50.
7. See, e.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823–25 (1990) (rejecting the argument that legislative history and an agency adjudication process should
be construed to divest state courts of the authority to hear claims arising under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884) (“Upon
the State courts . . . rests the obligation to guard, enforce, and protect every right
granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, whenever those rights are involved in any suit or proceeding before
them . . . .”); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) (noting that state courts have
jurisdiction unless “excluded by express provision, or by incompatibility in its exercise
arising from the nature of the particular case”).
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standing regimes, many of which welcome claims that do not depend
on any showing of concrete injury to a plaintiff.8 Taken together, those
three seemingly disparate aspects of the separation of powers and judicial federalism produce an outcome at best bizarre and at worst
harmful to the integrity of federal law.9
The paradox teaches two lessons, one narrow and one broad.
Narrowly, the paradox reveals the unintended consequences of the
Supreme Court’s development of the concreteness prong of the Article
8. See Wyatt Sassman, A Survey of Constitutional Standing in State Courts, 8 KY. J.
EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RES. L. 349, 354–98 (2015) (conducting a fifty-state survey and
showing that many states lack a concreteness requirement).
9. Some of the constituent parts of this phenomenon were apparent before
Spokeo. See, e.g., Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1257, 1260
(2011) (noting that distinctions between mandatory federal and often discretionary
state standing doctrine can prevent the Supreme Court from being “the supreme arbiter of federal law”); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91
IOWA L. REV. 243, 303–06 (2005) (noting tensions between standing doctrine and state
sovereign immunity doctrine); Paul J. Katz, Comment, Standing in Good Stead: State
Courts, Federal Standing Doctrine, and the Reverse-Erie Analysis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1315,
1319 (2005) (discussing how the multiplicity of state standing doctrines results in varying levels of enforcement of federal law); William Grantham, Restoring Citizen Suits
After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: The Use of Cooperative Federalism To Induce NonArticle III Standing in State Courts, 21 VT. L. REV. 977, 996–1011 (1997) (discussing Article III standing requirements and possible alternative methods of congressionally
mandated state court enforcement); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and the Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law by Non-Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003, 1038–42 (2001) (noting that these distinctions provide an opportunity for environmental advocates); Brian A. Stern, Note, An Argument Against
Imposing the Federal Case or Controversy Requirement on State Courts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
77, 108–23 (1994) (arguing against imposing federal standing requirements on state
courts applying federal law); William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 294–303
(1990) (arguing that state courts should be held to Article III standing requirements
in federal question cases); Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability of Federal
Claims in State Court, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1151 (1984) (noting the conflict and
arguing that the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to enforce federal law over
state standing doctrine). Each of those articles predates Spokeo v. Robins, discussed
infra Part I.A. Cf. Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 411, 437 (2018) (noting in passing the heightened nature of the paradox in
the wake of Spokeo). However, Spokeo’s full scope was not apparent until recent
changes in the law of Article III standing took shape. See Michael T. Morley, Spokeo:
The Quasi-Hohfeldian Plaintiff and the Nonfederal Federal Question, 25 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 583, 589–93 (2018) (noting Spokeo’s role); Zachary D. Clopton, Justiciability, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1431, 1432 (2018) [hereinafter Clopton, Justiciability] (arguing that Spokeo and other cases constitute invitations
for congressional specification of causes of action in state court and administrative
agencies); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Taking Article III Seriously: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 442, 449 (1991) (“Congress has never given the last word on any
claim of federal statutory right to state courts.”).
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III injury requirement, elaborated most recently in Spokeo v. Robins.10
Many commentators have criticized the Court’s decision in that case,
largely because it unjustly denies plaintiffs a forum for suit, misunderstands the gravity of consumer harm, confuses the law, and was driven
by ideological opposition to the plaintiffs’ bar.11 But proper understanding of the paradox reveals that many plaintiffs, and certainly
most plaintiffs’ lawyers, will have no problem finding a forum in which
to bring class actions asserting federal claims: state court. Thus, the
more significant reason to be wary of Spokeo and its progeny is that
they work a massive transfer of federal claims from federal to state
courts, where federal law will develop largely without the participation of federal courts.
The broader lesson is that, in our system of judicial federalism,
novel jurisdictional limitations have unintended consequences. For
that reason, every proposal to resolve the paradox that does not restore pre-Spokeo jurisdictional limits bumps up against some important principle of our federal judicial system: legislative supremacy,
the distinction between jurisdiction and merits, the requirement that
the federal judiciary decide actual controversies, the distinct sovereignty of the states, and the supervisory power of the Supreme Court
10. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540.
11. See, e.g., Richard L. Heppner Jr., Statutory Damages and Standing After Spokeo
v. Robins, 9 CONLAWNOW 125, 133 (2018) (noting that Spokeo frustrates the congressional intent to allow private enforcement of statutes); Lauren E. Willis, Spokeo Misspeaks, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 233, 240–44 (2017) (arguing that Spokeo misunderstands
the gravity of consumer harm); Craig Konnoth & Seth Kreimer, Spelling Out Spokeo,
265 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 60 (2016) (noting the Spokeo majority’s opposition to the
plaintiff’s bar); Jackson Erpenbach, Note, A Post-Spokeo Taxonomy of Intangible Harms,
118 MICH. L. REV. 471, 483 (2019) (arguing that Spokeo confuses the law); Vanessa K.
Ing, Note, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins: Determining What Makes an Intangible Harm Concrete,
32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 503, 504 (2017) (noting the confusion caused by Spokeo and
offering a three-part test).
The Vanderbilt Law Review held a symposium on Spokeo while the case was pending; all the discussants criticized the eventual outcome in the case. See Howard M. Wasserman, Fletcherian Standing, Merits, and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 257 (2015); Jonathan R. Siegel, Injury in Fact and the Structure of Legal Revolutions, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 207 (2015); Maxwell L. Stearns, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins
and the Constitutional Foundations of Standing, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 221 (2015);
Joan Steinman, Spokeo, Where Shalt Thou Stand, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 243 (2015);
Heather Elliott, Balancing as Well as Separating Power: Congress’s Authority To Recognize New Legal Rights, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 181 (2015); F. Andrew Hessick, Understanding Standing, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 195 (2015).
A forthcoming article written by F. Andrew Hessick argues that Spokeo’s logic
should apply even to common law breach of contract claims, casting doubt on its holding. See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing and Contracts, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3560567 [https://perma.cc/NZW3-RN88].
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over questions of federal law. By upsetting the balance of federal jurisdiction, Spokeo reveals the unintended consequences and hidden
tradeoffs of novel jurisdictional limits given the interlocking nature of
our judicial federalism.12 One’s preferred resolution of the paradox
acts as a mirror of one’s commitments as among the values of federalism, separation of powers, and the purpose of federal law.
The best way out of the paradox is to undo the novel jurisdictional
limitation introduced in Spokeo. Spokeo did not create the paradox but
intensified it and made it untenable. Overruling Spokeo—finding all
particularized statutory harms concrete for purposes of Article III—
eases the paradox’s tensions, ameliorates its costs, and requires the
fewest tradeoffs.
This Article has three parts. Part I describes the paradox by examining the interaction of the three distinct areas of doctrine that conspire to create it. First, it traces the Supreme Court’s new test for concrete injury under Article III, which serves to bar certain federal
statutory claims from being litigated in federal court. In particular, a
large and growing number of statutes promoting diverse consumerprotection goals such as data privacy, identity theft, and accurate
credit reports are increasingly held to be unenforceable in federal
court because the injuries they protect are insufficiently concrete.13
Next, this Part turns to state courts, where plaintiffs increasingly find
a more receptive forum for these federal claims. That oddity is made
possible by the variations in state-court standing rules, which differ
significantly from their federal analog.14 The kaleidoscope of statecourt jurisdictional rules makes the availability of a forum for the redress of many federal claims contingent on geography.
Part II explains and analyzes the costs of the paradox, which fall
equally on plaintiffs, defendants, and federal law alike. For plaintiffs,
the availability of state courts as sole fora for certain categories of

12. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, at xi (1953) (“One of the consequences of our federalism is a legal system

that derives from both the Nation and the States as separate sources of authority and
is administered by state and federal judiciaries, functioning in far more subtle combination than is readily perceived.”); see also id. (“The frequently neglected problems
posed in the administration of federal law by state courts.”).
13. See, e.g., Corozzo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 S.W.3d 566, 574–76 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2017) (embracing Spokeo in rejecting a Fair Credit Reporting Act claim).
14. See generally Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001) (analyzing and praising the
variation in state courts’ justiciability rules); Sassman, supra note 8.
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federal causes of action15 depends on accidents of where plaintiffs and
defendants reside and have jurisdictional contacts. For defendants,
who are typically the ones who argue for dismissal based on standing,16 the prevailing state of affairs is ironic because defendants generally prefer to litigate in federal court17 but have relegated themselves to state court.18 Most importantly, there are negative
consequences for federal law and the federal judiciary. Chief among
those is the possibility of disuniformity in federal law, a problem the
Supreme Court alone cannot solve. If the guiding principle for claim
allocation in the federal system is that federal law should be mainly
decided by federal courts (and state law by state courts), the present
state of affairs flips that presumption on its head.19
15. This phenomenon includes, but (as noted) is not limited to, statutory claims
where federal law makes available statutory damages and attorney’s fees. Some of the
statutes that include such provisions are 47 U.S.C. § 605(e); the Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (the statute at issue in Spokeo);
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k; the Stored Communications
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c); the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(3)(B); the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A); and the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(3). For an overview of
the use of private enforcement in effectuating congressional purpose, see generally
SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE
U.S. (2010).
16. In theory, standing is jurisdictional, meaning courts have an independent obligation to consider the issue sua sponte. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta,
534 U.S. 103, 110 (2001) (“We are obliged to examine standing sua sponte where
standing has erroneously been assumed below.”).
17. See Diego A. Zambrano, Federal Expansion and the Decay of State Courts, 86 U.
CHI. L. REV. 2101, 2156 (2019) (cataloguing reasons to “expect corporate defendants to
increasingly opt out of state court and move to federal court while plaintiffs’ attorneys
stay behind”); THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION
OF ATTORNEYS’ CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 6–9, 20–22 (2005) (comparing attitudes of defendants’ attorneys who removed cases to federal court with those
of plaintiffs’ attorneys who filed in federal court in the first instance); Victor E. Flango,
Attorneys’ Perspectives on Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 25 AKRON L. REV. 41, 63
(1991) (providing a quantitative analysis of the factors that attorneys consider when
deciding where to file in diversity cases).
18. See Robert J. Herrington, Think Twice Before Seeking Dismissal for Lack of
“Standing,” A.B.A.: PRAC. POINTS (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/litigation/committees/class-actions/practice/2017/think-twice-before
-seeking-dismissal-for-lack-of-standing [https://perma.cc/57BL-KGDG] (“[A] defendant can incur the expense of removing a case to federal court and demonstrating that
the plaintiff lacks standing, only to have all that work be for naught, with the case ending up back in state court and possibly being responsible for the plaintiff’s attorney
fees as well.”).
19. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 1236 (“One is likely to find little disagreement
with the proposition that ceteris paribus it is better for a sovereign’s own courts to
resolve novel or unsettled questions regarding that sovereign’s laws.”).
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Part III evaluates the paradox’s potential resolutions. That task is
complicated because a fully satisfactory fix must reconcile its collateral consequences on all other aspects of judicial federalism. No solution is without tradeoffs, and thus none is perfect. But overruling
Spokeo is the best path because it would remedy the imbalance that
case created between federal courts and state courts, on the one hand,
and the Supreme Court and Congress, on the other.
I. THE PATH TO EXCLUSIVE STATE-COURT JURISDICTION OVER
FEDERAL CLAIMS
This Part traces the doctrinal development of Article III’s requirement of concrete injury, shows how that requirement has forced many
federal statutory claims to be litigated in state court, and surveys state
standing doctrine to illustrate how federal rights are increasingly contingent on state-court jurisdictional rules.
A. LUJAN, SPOKEO, AND THE NEW UNDERSTANDING OF CONCRETE INJURY
Generally, to sue in federal court, a plaintiff must plead and later
prove three elements of Article III standing: (1) that she has suffered
legal injuries, (2) caused by the defendant, that (3) the court can remedy.20 Without such a showing, federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear
the case, and they must dismiss it or send it back to state court.21 This
requirement—a judicial gloss on Article III’s restriction of the federal
judicial power to “[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies”22—is a gatekeeper.23
20. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
21. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (specifying conditions for remand notwithstanding Rule 12(h)(3)).
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
23. There is a broad consensus that standing doctrine is a consequence of developments in the formation of the modern administrative state. The historiography of
these developments is split into two camps. The earlier view was that conservative
judges created standing doctrine to curtail the administrative state. See Raoul Berger,
Standing To Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816,
816 (1969) (assigning creation to Justice Frankfurter’s misreading of English common
law); F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
275, 290–99 (2008) (describing the ebb and flow of the doctrine in terms of court
makeup); Jonathan Levy, Comment, In Response to Fair Employment Council of Greater
Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp.: Employment Testers Do Have a Leg to Stand
On, 80 MINN. L. REV. 123, 129–34 (1995) (describing standing as originating in response to the administrative state, and a progressive easing of the doctrine in the
1970s). The revisionist view, first proposed by Steven Winter and Cass Sunstein, holds
that liberal judges invented standing to insulate the administrative state. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1436–38
(1988); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
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With liberal standing, plaintiffs face fewer obstacles to suit. With restrictive standing, defendants can more easily dismiss suits against
them.
In this way, a series of slow but steady changes to standing doctrine have conspired, over the last fifty years, to restrict access to federal courts.24 Almost all of the doctrinal changes to this requirement
involve the “injury” prong of that three-part test for standing.25 In
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 179–81 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, Standing After
Lujan]; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance,
40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1452–57 (1988).
Either way, there is rough agreement among commentators in both camps that
standing doctrine was an invention of modern judges, not the founders. See John A.
Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1009 (2002) (asserting that the Supreme
Court “fabricat[ed] the doctrine[] of standing” in the twentieth century); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 216–17 (1993) (noting the difficulty of bringing a
claim against the government in a labor contract case and that this difficulty was created by the Court applying standing doctrine). But see Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 691 (2004) (“We do
not claim that history compels acceptance of the modern Supreme Court’s vision of
standing, or that the constitutional nature of standing doctrine was crystal clear from
the moment of the Founding on. . . . We do, however, argue that history does not defeat
standing doctrine; the notion of standing is not an innovation, and its constitutionalization does not contradict a settled historical consensus about the Constitution’s
meaning.”); James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article III, the Injuryin-Fact Rule, and the Framers’ Plan for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1, 38–48 (2001) (articulating a quasi-originalist argument for the injury-in-fact
rule, while acknowledging the rule’s recent vintage).
Those who disagree tend nevertheless to confess that they are motivated to study
the topic of standing because of the growth of the administrative state. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 887 (1983) (“An even more important development has been
the interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act to create liberalized judicial review provisions where none existed before. . . . [T]hat development . . . has been of
enormous consequence.”); Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good for, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1663, 1664 (2007) (arguing that standing doctrine promotes efficient alienation
of constitutional rights where “many people’s rights are affected by a single government policy”).
24. See generally STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT:
THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 130–91 (2017) (cataloging empirically how the Court has used Article III to restrict the law that governs private enforcement). For an explanation of why statutes providing for private enforcement may
have provoked a judicial backlash in the form of restrictive standing rules, see Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives To Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 784 (2011), theorizing that
fee shifting induces judicial backlash.
25. Cf. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 64 (3d
ed. 2006) (“The Supreme Court has said that the core of Article III’s requirement for
cases and controversies is found in the rule that standing is limited to those who allege
that they personally have suffered or imminently will suffer an injury.”).
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grappling with what constitutes an “injury” for purposes of Article III,
the Supreme Court has continually added additional doctrinal requirements. The injury must be: “actual,” “imminent,” “particularized,” non-“hypothetical,” non-“conjectural,” and—most relevant
here—“concrete.”26 As litigants have pressed the boundaries of what
constitutes standing, the Justices have generally held that claimed injuries were insufficient.27
Scholarly criticism of this restrictive turn in the law of standing
has been voluminous, though it has not succeeded in moving the
Court. The traditional critiques of standing doctrine are that it is by
turns conceptually incoherent28 and nakedly partisan.29 Like the
caselaw, the criticism has mostly focused on the injury requirement.30
26. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
27. See, e.g., id. at 566–67 (holding that environmental groups lacked standing to
sue over whether government regulations violated the Endangered Species Act).
28. In 1966, testifying before a Senate subcommittee on constitutional rights,
Harvard Professor Paul Freund called the concept of standing “among the most amorphous in the entire domain of public law.” Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on
Const. Rts. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 498 (1966) (statement of Prof.
Paul A. Freund); cf. Winter, supra note 23, at 1372 (noting that it is “almost de rigueur
for articles on standing to quote Professor Freund’s testimony to Congress”). Similarly,
Justice Harlan accused the majority in Flast v. Cohen of “reduc[ing] constitutional
standing to a word game played by secret rules.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent
the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62
STAN. L. REV. 591, 594 (2010) (calling standing doctrine “the Rorschach test of federal
courts”); Christopher T. Burt, Comment, Procedural Injury Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 285 (1995) (observing that the Supreme
Court’s procedural-injury standard is “vague and provides little guidance for prospective plaintiffs and the lower courts”). The Supreme Court itself has confessed that the
area generally resists conceptual coherence. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs.
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
29. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741,
1742–43 (1999) (“I have concluded that I would be doing [my students] a grave disservice if I took that traditional legal approach in teaching the law of standing. [They]
can predict judicial decisions in this area with much greater accuracy if they ignore
doctrine and rely entirely on a simple description of the law of standing that is rooted
in political science: judges provide access to the courts to individuals who seek to further the political and ideological agendas of judges.”).
30. E.g., Sunstein, Standing After Lujan, supra note 23 (discussing how to move
forward after Lujan’s shift regarding injuries-in-fact); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 229 (1988) (arguing for rejection of the injury-in-fact
requirement); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 635, 650 (1985) (noting the flexibility of current precedent); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 31–32 (1984) (criticizing the Court for neglecting
the intent of Congress by requiring concrete injury).
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Indeed, many scholars questioned the very existence of an injury requirement.31
Despite that criticism, the Court has continued to push the injury
requirement down its restrictive path, typically in cases divided
sharply along partisan lines.32 The newest developments—and the
ones that contribute most directly to our paradox—concern the requirement that the plaintiff’s injury be “concrete” rather than simply
“procedural.”33 As we will see, although the rhetoric of concreteness
is not new, its contours as a doctrinal requirement distinct from the
requirement of particularization are. Whereas particularization is
about whether the plaintiff has suffered an injury more acute than has
the public at large, the new requirement of concreteness is about
whether the plaintiff’s injury is sufficiently tangible, even assuming it
is particular to her.
Critical to this story, concreteness is effectively a restriction on
types of injuries rather than types of plaintiffs.34 The requirements
that injuries be imminent, non-hypothetical, and particularized all go
to the particular connection between the injury claimed, the plaintiff
claiming it, and the time at which she claims it. An insufficiently imminent injury can be sufficient later, once it has become more proximate.35 A hypothetical injury can be sufficient if a plaintiff can be
found who suffered it.36 In the same way, the concept of particularization implies that there is some plaintiff who feels the injury most
acutely, and, in turn, that such a person would have standing to sue.
By contrast, concreteness—because it goes to the nature of the
injury itself, rather than the plaintiff’s nexus to it37—potentially applies to any plaintiff claiming certain injuries. In other words, if one
type of injury is found to be non-concrete, no one can sue in federal
court to redress it.

31. See Fletcher, supra note 30, at 223–24 (arguing that whether a plaintiff has
suffered an injury is a question for substantive law rather than Article III).
32. See Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 668–69 (2004)
(finding empirically that Supreme Court standing decisions reflect judicial ideology).
33. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
34. Cf. Scalia, supra note 23, at 892 (“[I]f all persons who could conceivably raise
a particular issue are excluded, the issue is excluded as well.”).
35. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 (1992) (discussing the imminence requirement).
36. Cf. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 415–16 (2013) (differentiating
this from present injuries incurred in the attempt to avoid hypothetical injuries).
37. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (noting that the defining feature of an injury’s
concreteness is that “it must actually exist”).
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To understand the significance of the concreteness requirement,
we turn now to the two cases that gave it birth and bite, respectively:
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.38
1. Lujan and the Seeds of Uncertainty
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife presented the question of whether
Congress could create Article III standing purely by specifying a statutory cause of action.39 The Endangered Species Act40 requires federal
agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that
any action those agencies take does not threaten endangered species
or their habitats.41 In 1986, the Reagan administration issued regulations interpreting the law’s consultation requirement to apply only to
government action in the United States or on the high seas.42 In response, several environmental and wildlife-conservation nonprofits
sued to block the change pursuant to the so-called “citizen-suit” provision of the ESA, under which “any person may commence a civil
suit . . . to enjoin . . . any . . . agency . . . alleged to be in violation of any
provision” of the ESA.43 They alleged that the failure to consult accelerated the extinction of endangered and threatened species, which in
turn injured them because they could not enjoy the observation of
those species.44 The chronic question throughout the case was
whether the nonprofits or their members had suffered an Article III
injury and thus whether federal courts had jurisdiction.
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia rejected each of the plaintiffs’
alleged injuries.45 The Court began by observing that the loss of enjoyment or use from damage to endangered species or their habitats
qualified as sufficient injury for Article III purposes.46 But the Court
disagreed that the plaintiffs themselves particularly felt such a loss.
Plaintiffs’ members claimed to have visited Egypt and Sri Lanka and
observed endangered wildlife in those places—wildlife they alleged
was now threatened by engineering projects carried out in part with
38. Lujan, 504 U.S. 555; Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540.
39. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–60, 571–72.
40. Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544).
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
42. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558–59.
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
44. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562.
45. Id. at 562–67.
46. Id. at 562–63 (“[T]he desire to use or observe an animal species, even for
purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.”
(citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972))).
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U.S. assistance.47 Each swore to have intentions of returning to those
places, but neither had specific plans to do so.48 That lack of specific
intention to return meant that, for the Court, the plaintiffs’ claimed injury was not particularized.49 In other words, the plaintiffs failed to
show that they themselves, as opposed to the public at large, were
likely to be harmed by damage to the endangered species or their habitat. That fact was fatal to their case for standing.50 Stated in terms of
doctrinal categories, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ injuries were
insufficiently particular but said little about whether they were sufficiently concrete.
Doctrinal categories are key to understanding Lujan’s wide influence because of the way the Court’s opinion reorganized and restated
standing doctrine. Lujan is among the most cited Supreme Court cases
of all time, and many of those citations are because of Lujan’s concise
articulation of the applicable legal standard.51 As the Court put it, the
three requirements for Article III standing are injury, causation, and
redressability, each of which has additional subcategories.52 As noted,
our focus is on two of the subcategories of the injury-in-fact prong,
concreteness and particularization: “the plaintiff must have suffered
47. Id. at 563.
48. Id. at 563–64.
49. Id. at 567 (“It goes beyond the limit, however, and into pure speculation and
fantasy, to say that anyone who observes or works with an endangered species, anywhere in the world, is appreciably harmed by a single project affecting some portion
of that species with which he has no more specific connection.”).
50. The Court also rejected two other theories of standing: “ecosystem nexus” and
“animal nexus.” Both of those theories were yet less particularized than the intent-toreturn theory the Court also rejected. See id. at 565–67. Finally, a plurality of the Court
would have held that the plaintiffs also failed to meet the redressability prong of the
standing inquiry. See id. at 568–71. Justices Kennedy and Souter declined to join the
portion of the majority opinion that would have held that the plaintiffs failed to show
redressability, leaving that conclusion without a majority. See id. at 580 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
51. See Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron at 30: Looking Back and
Looking Forward—Foreword, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 n.2 (2014) (reporting Lujan
as the second-most-cited administrative law case ever decided, behind only Chevron);
Christopher J. Walker, Most Cited Supreme Court Administrative Law Decisions, YALE J.
ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Oct. 9, 2014), https://yalejreg.com/nc/most-cited
-supreme-court-administrative-law-decisions-by-chris-walker [https://perma.cc/
BPF8-DFFE] (providing full data). Since it was issued in 1992, the case has been cited
in judicial opinions more than 20,000 times. See Westlaw (reporting 21,620 citations
as of Jan. 31, 2019). By contrast, despite the benefit of an additional thirty years, multiple additional legal issues, and dozens of additional pages of language to quote, Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), has only been cited in judicial opinions roughly 5,000
times. See id.
52. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561–62.

2021]

JURISDICTION PARADOX

1223

an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”53
In part because Lujan’s statement of the legal standard is now so
familiar, it is easy to overlook the way it marked a break with prior
cases in how it described the applicable legal standard. In particular,
past cases had not specified that “concrete” and “particularized” were
two separate sub-elements of the injury-in-fact prong of the test for
Article III standing. Instead, those earlier cases tended to focus solely
on particularization; they mentioned the requirement that an injury
be concrete only as a synonym for particularity.54 No prior case had
ever stated in dicta—let alone held—that concreteness required
something separate from particularization.55 By setting the requirements of concreteness and particularization apart, Lujan’s formulation thus subtly expanded the doctrinal test for standing. By enumerating these sub-elements conjunctively, Lujan suggested that they
have different content and must be satisfied separately. This somewhat revisionist doctrinal distillation proved extremely influential.56
Lujan’s restatement of the injury prong also creates the holding
most important for purposes of the present paradox: just because a
plaintiff has a statutory right, she does not necessarily also have
53. Id. at 560 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
54. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“A plaintiff must allege
personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely
to be redressed by the requested relief.” (emphasis added)); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498 (1975) (“[T]he standing question is whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 508 (requiring “concrete facts” of
personalized injury (emphasis added)).
55. In formulating the injury-in-fact test, the Court cited three cases: Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490; and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972). None of those cases spoke of concreteness as anything but an aspect of
particularization. Allen spoke of concreteness only in the context of particularization
and redressability. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 756–57. Warth used the word “concrete” or its
derivations only in describing the redressability prong and in characterizing the type
of factual allegations that could prove particularization. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 504,
508. Finally, Sierra Club used the word “concrete” only in a footnote characterizing de
Tocqueville’s description of judicial review. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 740–41 n.16.
56. See Richard M. Re, Standing’s Lujan-ification, RE’S JUDICATA (Feb. 1, 2015, 7:12
AM), https://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2015/02/01/standings-lujan
-ification [https://perma.cc/SGT4-DXHA] (observing that Lujan’s doctrinal recitation
“was a statement meant to be quoted and cited—and it has been” and reporting 7,400
Westlaw citations to Lujan’s doctrinal headnote alone); see also infra Part I.C (arguing
that Lujan’s doctrinalization of standing law sparked the phenomenon of “reactive divergence,” the process by which states differentially adopt or reject federal standing
rules in direct reaction to Supreme Court caselaw).
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Article III standing. Indeed, if such a right did confer standing automatically, the case would have been an easy win for the plaintiffs, because the Endangered Species Act authorizes “any person” to sue to
enforce its terms.57 The Court’s contrary holding that the citizen-suit
provision was not enough relied on the premise that, regardless of any
statutory cause of action, a plaintiff must also have a particularized
and concrete injury.58
Yet the concreteness prong remained vague because of the
Court’s finding that the plaintiffs’ theory of standing failed to satisfy
the particularization prong.59 There were therefore two lingering
questions about the concreteness requirement after Lujan, one broad
and one narrow. First, and more generally, it was unclear what sorts
of injuries or interests would count as concrete enough to prove
standing.60 Second, and more specifically, could Congress create a concrete injury by specifying an award for a successful suit, as with a statutory-damages claim?61

57. That was the logic of the lower court. See Defs. of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d
117, 121 (8th Cir. 1990) (“[W]e are persuaded that the Act is a statute imposing statutory duties which create correlative procedural rights in a given plaintiff, the invasion
of which is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of injury in fact in article III.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (citizen-suit provision).
58. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–76.
59. Id. at 567.
60. See id. at 577 (“If the concrete injury requirement has the separation-of-powers significance we have always said, the answer must be obvious: To permit Congress
to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with
the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional
duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ Art. II, § 3.”).
61. The Court explicitly distinguished cases in which the plaintiff’s concrete interest derives from the promise of statutory recovery: “[This is not] the unusual case
in which Congress has created a concrete private interest in the outcome of a suit
against a private party for the Government’s benefit, by providing a cash bounty for
the victorious plaintiff.” Id. at 572–73. However, this language was likely intended to
distinguish qui tam whistleblower suits, such as those under the False Claims Act, 31
U.S.C. § 3730(d). That statute authorizes a successful plaintiff suing on behalf of the
federal government to recover for her own account a percentage of the recovery obtained for the government. See id. (specifying recovery percentages).
The Court later specified, also in an opinion by Justice Scalia, that qui tam whistleblowers have Article III standing on the theory that the government has partially assigned to such whistleblowers its own damages claim arising out of the fraud against
it. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000).
In so holding, the Court noted in dicta that “an interest that is merely a ‘byproduct’ of
the suit itself”—such as the right to recover attorney’s fees or costs—“cannot give rise
to a cognizable injury in fact for Article III standing purposes.” Id.
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2. Spokeo and an Uncertain Future
In Lujan’s wake, it seemed that concreteness and particularization were separate elements of injury-in-fact, but the content of the
concreteness requirement was unclear. That question lingered for
over a decade after Lujan.62 Then Spokeo came to the Court.63 And in
some ways, Spokeo offers only a partial answer, because it relied on
an incomplete record and therefore its holding purported to be limited. But as we will see, the logic of that holding implied a broader
sweep: Congress cannot confer concreteness.
Spokeo involved a statutory cause of action with a provision for
statutory damages. The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA),64 as
amended by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003,65
requires “consumer reporting agencies” to follow reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of the information in credit reports they
provide to third parties.66 To enforce its various requirements, FCRA
creates a private cause of action, imposes statutory damages of up to
$1,000 for each willful violation of the act,67 and authorizes awards of
punitive damages68 and attorney’s fees69 to successful plaintiffs.
The defendant in the case, Spokeo, is a people-search website that
allows users to search for individuals by name, email address, or
phone number.70 Search results can include information about an individual’s age, address, marital status, occupation, household value,
wealth, and “economic health.”71

62. In part, that was because opportunities to address it disappeared mysteriously. After briefing and oral argument in a case presenting this issue in October Term
2011, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted on the last day
of the term. See First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 567 U.S. 756, 757 (2012) (per curiam).
Perhaps the case’s decision was a victim of the day’s news, as it was dismissed on the
same day the Affordable Care Act was upheld in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 520 (2012).
63. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
64. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127.
65. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117
Stat. 1952 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
67. Id. § 1681n(a)(1)(A).
68. Id. § 1681n(a)(2).
69. Id. § 1681n(c).
70. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016).
71. Id. While such information is provided at no cost, Spokeo sells more detailed
reports to paying subscribers. See id. at 1546.
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The plaintiff, Thomas Robins, learned that the information
Spokeo maintained about him was factually inaccurate.72 Although
Spokeo correctly listed his address and even siblings’ names, it included inaccurate information about his age, marital status, employment, education, and children.73 It also included a photograph of
someone else.74
Robins sued Spokeo on behalf of a putative class, invoking the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over claims arising under federal law.75 Robins’s complaint alleged that he was “concerned” that
such “inaccuracies” would “affect his ability to obtain credit, employment, insurance, and the like.”76 He alleged to be particularly concerned about his prospects for finding a job, as he was then out of
work and seeking employment.77 He also ultimately claimed that the
incorrect information about him had “caused actual harm to [his] employment prospects,” causing him to lose money and suffer from “anxiety, stress, concern, and/or worry” about those prospects.78
Spokeo moved to dismiss on the grounds that, as relevant here,79
Robins lacked Article III standing to sue in federal court because he
failed to plead a concrete injury.80 In particular, Spokeo argued that
Robins’s sole injury was his speculative and hypothetical concern
about future harm, rather than any statutorily defined harm.81 The
district court dismissed the complaint because his alleged injuries
could not meet Article III’s standing requirement, concluding that a
“[m]ere violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act does not confer Article III standing . . . where no injury in fact is properly pled.”82
The Ninth Circuit reversed, per Judge O’Scannlain.83 Judge
O’Scannlain, a Reagan appointee, reasoned that a violation of a
72. Complaint at 5, Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., No. CV 10-5306, 2011 WL 597867 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Spokeo Complaint].
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In addition to FCRA claims, Robins also pressed a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West 2004).
76. Spokeo Complaint, supra note 72.
77. Id.
78. Amended Complaint at 5, Spokeo, 2011 WL 597867 (No. CV 10-5306).
79. Spokeo also argued that Robins failed to state a claim with respect to the FCRA
claims because Spokeo is not a “credit reporting agency” as that term is defined by
statute. Spokeo, 2011 WL 597867, at *1. The district court did not reach that argument.
Id. at *2.
80. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546 (2016).
81. Id.
82. Spokeo, 2011 WL 11562151.
83. Robins v. Spokeo, 742 F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2014).
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statutory right “is usually a sufficient injury in fact to confer standing,”
and that, so long as the statutory right is particularized, Congress can
create a statutory right that, when violated, sustains an Article III injury-in-fact.84
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, after briefing and argument, vacated and remanded.85 The Court, per Justice Alito, held
that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis properly asked whether Robins’s injury was particularized but failed to ask whether it was concrete.86
Calling the Ninth Circuit’s analysis “incomplete,” the Court remanded
for further proceedings below.87 By requiring separate analysis of the
concreteness prong, Spokeo did the doctrinal work necessary to entrench the distinction between Lujan’s two prongs of the injury-in-fact
requirement. Despite the ostensibly limited scope of the Court’s disposition of the case, that doctrinal distinction would have substantial
effect in the lower courts.
Not only did the Court emphasize that concreteness is distinct
from particularization, but it also held that statutory injuries are not
per se concrete:
Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean
that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that
person to sue to vindicate that right. Article III standing requires a concrete
injury even in the context of a statutory violation.88

Spokeo thus also clarified that Congress alone cannot legislatively
specify a concrete injury for purposes of Article III, though it left unclear exactly what “role” Congress has in “identifying and elevating intangible harms.”89
Spokeo stands in tension with some earlier cases that appeared
to hold that invasion of a personal statutory right was sufficient for
purposes of Article III, creating ambiguity.90 The majority opinion
84. Id. at 412–14. The court disclaimed any consideration of Robins’s claim that
his diminished employment prospects or associated anxiety constituted a separate injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing. Id. at 414 n.3.
85. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550.
86. Id. at 1548.
87. Id. at 1550.
88. Id. at 1549.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–74 (1982) (“A
tester who has been the object of a misrepresentation made unlawful under § 804(d)
has suffered injury in precisely the form the statute was intended to guard against, and
therefore has standing to maintain a claim for damages under the Act’s provisions.”);
Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989) (“[R]efusal to permit appellants
to scrutinize the ABA Committee’s activities to the extent FACA allows constitutes a
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apparently reasoned that such cases were distinguishable because
they involved alleged intangible harms that were similar enough to
harms cognizable at common law that they constituted concrete injuries.91 Yet the Court’s failure to grapple explicitly with the seemingly
inconsistent prior caselaw left substantial ambiguity about the scope
of its holding and the path of the law going forward.92
That ambiguity is spreading to other types of statutory claims in
lower federal courts, sometimes at the Supreme Court’s invitation.93
In the recent case of Frank v. Gaos, the Supreme Court ordered a second round of briefing on the question of concrete injury in light of
Spokeo, even though the issue of standing was not addressed below.94
After considering eight supplemental briefs from the parties and
amici, the Court issued a brief opinion vacating the judgment below
for further proceedings to address the “wide variety of legal and factual issues not addressed in the merits briefing . . . or at oral argument,” including “[r]esolution of the standing question.”95 And in another recent case, after requesting special briefing about whether
ERISA beneficiaries suffer an Article III injury when their retirement
plans are mismanaged but they have not yet suffered a financial loss,
the Court relied on Spokeo to hold that they did not.96
sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue.”); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins,
524 U.S. 11, 19–20 (1998). Indeed, Robins relied heavily on such cases in his argument
to the Supreme Court. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548–49, 1553. But see Bradford C.
Mank, The Supreme Court Acknowledges Congress’ Authority To Confer Informational
Standing in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1377, 1377 (2017) (arguing that
Spokeo can be reconciled with Akins and Public Citizen).
91. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (“Because the doctrine of standing derives from
the case-or-controversy requirement, and because that requirement in turn is
grounded in historical practice, it is instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as
providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”).
92. In dissent, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that such caselaw can be understood as
requiring examination of “Congress’ connection of procedural requirements to the prevention of a substantive harm.” Id. at 1555 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). If so, the FCRA
claims at issue in the case would seem to qualify: “Just as the right to truthful information at stake in Havens . . . was closely tied to the Fair Housing Act’s goal of eradicating racial discrimination in housing, so the right here at stake is closely tied to the
FCRA’s goal of protecting consumers against dissemination of inaccurate credit information about them.” Id. at 1555 n.3.
93. See infra Part II.A (discussing the spread of FACTA claims through state
courts).
94. Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 475 (2018). The question presented upon grant of
certiorari concerned the propriety of cy-près awards in class-action settlements.
95. Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1046 (2019).
96. See Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 139 S. Ct. 2771 (2019); Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,
140 S. Ct. 1615 (2020).
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B. FEDERAL CLAIMS IN STATE COURTS
Yet despite these Article III obstacles to federal claims being
heard in federal court, many sorts of claims implicated by Spokeo are
still viable—in state court. In fact, in the wake of Spokeo, FCRA claims
increasingly are being brought in state courts.97 Although the Ninth
Circuit held on remand that the plaintiff in Spokeo adequately pleaded
standing,98 lawyers for other plaintiffs bringing similar claims have already begun suing in state court.99 For example, the law firm that represented the plaintiff in Spokeo has warned that the case will simply
shift future litigation to state court rather than blocking it outright.100
That shift in forum is made possible by a central feature of our
federal court system: plaintiffs generally are free to bring federal
claims in state courts, which control their own jurisdiction. The basic
logic of this arrangement is apparent from the Supremacy Clause,
which makes “the Laws of the United States . . . the supreme Law of the
Land” and mandates that “Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby.”101 Because federal law binds state judges, they must apply it
in cases that present it.102 Put differently, the Supremacy Clause
makes federal law a part of the law of every state, meaning that state
courts must apply it just as they would their own laws. Indeed, the
97. See Allison Grande, Spokeo Helps Consumer Return FCRA Claims to State Court,
LAW360 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/884799/spokeo-helps
-consumer-return-fcra-claims-to-state-court [https://perma.cc/37CS-GJV9] (noting
trend).
98. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied
138 S. Ct. 931 (2018).
99. See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Spokeo Backlash: Dismissed in Federal Court, Class Actions Move to States, REUTERS (May 16, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/usotc
-spokeo-idUSKCN18C2DK [https://perma.cc/7CW4-2ELH].
100. See Roger Perlstadt & Jay Edelson, Learning the Limits (and Irony) of Spokeo,
LAW360 (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/871191/learning-the
-limits-and-irony-of-spokeo [https://perma.cc/6NZK-3MZG].
101. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
102. See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v.
Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,
477–78 (1981); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507–08 (1962); Testa
v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392 (1947); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 631 (1884); Claflin v.
Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) (“State courts can exercise . . . jurisdiction . . .
where it is not excluded by express provision, or by incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular case.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 386 (Alexander Hamilton) (Glazier, Masters & Smith eds., 1837) (“When . . . we consider the
state governments and the national governments, as they truly are, in the light of kindred systems, and as parts of one whole, the inference seems to be conclusive, that the
state courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of
the union, where it was not expressly prohibited.”).
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constitution was drafted assuming that Congress did not need to create any lower federal courts—under the bargain known as the Madisonian Compromise103—a fact that highlights state courts as important adjudicators of federal claims in the constitutional system.
Other than when Congress specifies exclusive federal jurisdiction, the
only limit on plaintiffs’ ability to bring federal claims in state court are
the states’ own justiciability rules—for example, standing doctrine
under state law.104
Subject to the proviso that they may not discriminate against federal claims, states are free to fashion their own jurisdictional rules,
which may or may not allow some plaintiffs or claims. The Supreme
Court held in the 1989 case of ASARCO v. Kadish—to which we will
return105—that when it comes to plaintiff standing to sue, state courts
are free to “cho[o]se a different path” by taking “no account of federal
standing rules.”106 “That result properly follows from the allocation of
authority in the federal system . . . . [T]he constraints of Article III do
not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not
bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules
of justiciability even when they address issues of federal law . . . .”107

103. The Madisonian Compromise is also shorthand for the idea, somewhat contested, that state courts have the power, and perhaps an affirmative duty, to hear federal causes of action. See Martin H. Redish & John E. Muench, Adjudication of Federal
Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 311, 311 (1976) (arguing that the Madisonian Compromise requires state courts to entertain federal causes of action). But
see Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 43 (arguing that the simple account of the Madisonian Compromise is incorrect and that the belief at the time of the framing was that state courts
were not empowered to hear all federal claims).
104. There are important limits on states’ ability to use those kinds of jurisdictional rules to discriminate between state and federal claims: state courts must allow
a federal claim where they would allow an analogous state law claim. See, e.g., Howlett
v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 356 (1990); Testa, 330 U.S. at 394; McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry.,
292 U.S. 230, 233–34 (1934); Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1,
59 (1912). For scholarly discussion of the extent of this duty, see generally Martin H.
Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts: Implications
for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71 (1998), which discusses how
federal courts might “commandeer” state courts and the implications of this power;
Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State Court, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145 (1984), which explores the role of state substantive law “in
protecting the rights of individuals”; and Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and
the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 187,
206–07, which examines power and obligation of state courts to hear federal cases.
105. See infra Part II.C.
106. ASARCO v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989).
107. Id.
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Because ASARCO was decided in the midst of the revolution in
federal standing doctrine that ended with Lujan, its reaffirmance that
those rules did not apply to state courts is important and enduring.108
ASARCO thus represents the important principle that the limits of Article III jurisdiction have no binding force on state courts—unless they
choose to follow those limits of their own accord.
C. THE DIVERSITY OF STATE-COURT STANDING LAW
Although federal standing rules do not apply to state courts, state
standing law is often a shadow of its federal counterpart.109 This is
surprising. No state constitution imposes the “case or controversy” requirement that the federal Constitution does.110 Thus, state courts
could develop unique justiciability doctrine consistent with their own
constitutional text and history.111
Instead, state courts regularly define their justiciability rules
based on federal law.112 They grapple with, and ultimately incorporate
or reject, federal caselaw when deciding standing cases.113 Sometimes
they do so because litigants urge them to incorporate federal doctrine
into state law; other times they do so sua sponte to provide theoretical
grounding to a complex and seemingly arbitrary set of holdings.114
108. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997) (noting that “[t]here would be
nothing irrational about a system that granted standing” in a wider range of cases than
the federal system does).
109. See, e.g., Enright v. Lehmann, 735 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn. 2007) (citing and
following federal precedent).
110. See Hershkoff, supra note 14, at 1882–98 (noting the differences in state separation-of-powers systems over time and among states, particularly as compared to
the federal government).
111. State standing law therefore offers an answer to the question: if standing law
were different, how different would it be? Cf. BEN LINDBERGH & SAM MILLER, THE ONLY
RULE IS IT HAS TO WORK 272 (2017) (theorizing that, if baseball were different, it would
be only slightly different, “because baseball’s time-tested equilibrium is difficult to disrupt”); Episode 396: Your Emails, Answered, Effectively Wild (Feb. 28, 2014) (downloaded using Overcast) (answering question from listener Vinit, “If baseball were different, how different would it be? Would it only be slightly different or VERY
different?”).
112. See, e.g., Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex.
1993) (“[W]e look to the more extensive jurisprudential evidence of the federal courts
on this subject for any guidance it may yield.”); Lee v. Macomb City Bd. of Comm’rs,
629 N.W.2d 900, 905 (Mich. 2001) (referring to federal doctrine of standing to guide
ruling).
113. See Thomas B. Bennett, State Rejection of Federal Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also, e.g., Zeyen v. Pocatello/Chubbuck Sch. Dist., 451
P.3d 25, 36 (Idaho 2019) (Stegner, J., dissenting).
114. See, e.g., Glengary-Gamlin Protective Ass’n v. Bird, 675 P.2d 344, 347–49
(Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (looking to U.S. Supreme Court cases for test of organizational
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Regardless of their impetus or motivation for doing so, state courts
react to federal standing cases so that the doctrinal lines drawn in federal cases become inscribed in state law—either affirmatively or negatively.115
State courts’ reaction to Lujan shows this pattern well. As discussed in Section A above, Lujan was influential in large part because
of its concise restatement of doctrine.116 Because it was easily borrowed, Lujan sparked a nationwide reexamination by state courts of
standing that reshaped the receptiveness of those courts to claims by
plaintiffs who would be barred from federal court for lack of standing.117
State courts’ varied reception to Lujan’s revised standing
doctrine led to a kaleidoscope of state standing rules. Figure 1 maps
that kaleidoscope.118 Each state has been categorized along two dimensions: whether it adopted Lujan and whether its standing doctrine is constitutional or prudential.

standing); Utsey v. Coos Cnty., 32 P.3d 933, 949 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (describing the
development of Oregon’s justiciability doctrine as it formed in parallel with federal
doctrine).
115. See Bennett, supra note 113.
116. See Re, supra note 56 (observing that Lujan’s doctrinal recitation “was a statement meant to be quoted and cited—and it has been,” and reporting 7,400 Westlaw
citations to Lujan’s doctrinal headnote alone).
117. See Bennett, supra note 113.
118. In coding states for purposes of this chart and analysis, I relied substantially
on Wyatt Sassman’s detailed and impressive survey of state standing law. See generally
Sassman, supra note 8.
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Figure 1: State-Court Adoption of Lujan
Because Lujan sharpened the injury-in-fact requirement for statutory claims, the roughly half of states that follow its holding are generally more likely to dismiss such claims for lack of standing. But for
many reasons—including change in court composition, a general lack
of standing cases in state courts, and the politicization of standing as
a legal issue—a state’s adherence to Lujan is no guarantee that
Spokeo-type claims will be barred there.119 On the other hand, rejection of Lujan does not preclude a state’s judiciary from concluding that
Spokeo-type plaintiffs lack standing. Instead, Spokeo gives state courts
a new chance to decide whether to follow federal doctrine. Just as with
Lujan, we should expect states to make different choices—and indeed
they already are.
That state-by-state variation creates ambiguity and disuniformity about the availability of a valid forum for federal statutory
claims. To be sure, the diversity of state-court jurisdictional rules is
119. See infra Part I.D (describing states such as North Carolina, which rejected
Lujan but bar FACTA claims).
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generally praised.120 But here it not only creates uncertainty about
where a suit can be brought but also effectively robs many plaintiffs
of any effective remedy.
D. THE PARADOX IN ACTION: THE FACTA WARS
A series of recent cases involving the electronics retailer P.C.
Richard & Son makes the paradox’s impact clear in two ways.121 First,
they highlight the practical problems that plaintiffs can face in finding
a valid forum in the wake of Spokeo. Second, they show how Spokeo’s
reach extends beyond FCRA to many other types of federal statutory
claims. In particular, these suits asserted claims under the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA)122 alleging that the
retailer had included too much of their credit card information on

120. See, e.g., Sassman, supra note 8; Schapiro, supra note 9, at 305 (noting that
“[s]tate courts can participate in the implementation of federal rights that might otherwise not be enforced”); Hershkoff, supra note 14, at 1854; Elmendorf, supra note 9,
at 1003 (“It is my contention that state courts can, will, and should adjudicate the federal environmental claims of parties who lack Article III standing.”). But see Fletcher,
supra note 9, at 265 (“In this article, I propose a more thoroughgoing reform: State
courts should be required to adhere to article III ‘case or controversy’ requirements
whenever they adjudicate questions of federal law.”); James W. Doggett, Note, “Trickle
Down” Constitutional Interpretation: Should Federal Limits on Legislative Conferral of
Standing Be Imported into State Constitutional Law?, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 842
(2008) (“[S]tate courts should give a hard look at how their own constitutions differ
from the Federal Constitution before following federal precedent.”).
For defenses of state court decisions generally declining to follow federal precedent in questions of state constitutional law, see generally JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 174–78
(2018), which argues against “lockstepping,” “the tendency of some state courts to diminish their constitutions by interpreting them in reflexive imitation of the federal
courts’ interpretation of the Federal Constitution”; Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 339 (2011), which notes that
many states will “apply their own constitutional provisions in lockstep with federal
analogues”; and James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
MICH. L. REV. 761, 766, which states, “[T]o the extent that . . . a state constitutional discourse exists, its terms and conventions are often borrowed wholesale from federal
constitutional discourse, as though the language of federal constitutional law were
some sort of lingua franca of constitutional argument generally.”
121. See O’Shea v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, No. 15-Civ-9069, 2017 WL 3327602, at
*3–7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2017); Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, No. OCN-L-911-18 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 17, 2019).
122. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–159, 117
Stat. 1952 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681n(a) (creating cause of action).
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retail receipts.123 FACTA, like the FCRA, creates a private cause of action and an entitlement to statutory damages plus attorney’s fees.124
The plaintiffs filed their first suit in federal court in their home
state of New York, where they faced the standing barrier erected by
Spokeo.125 Because the only injury the plaintiffs alleged was the improper receipt—and not any of its concrete consequences—P.C. Richard & Son moved to dismiss for lack of injury-in-fact.126 Based on
Spokeo and its progeny, the federal court dismissed the claims without
prejudice for lack of standing.127
After being thrown out of federal court, the same plaintiffs refiled
their claims in New Jersey state court, where liberal standing rules
prevail.128 The complaints were substantially the same.129 In their new
suit, the plaintiffs claimed injury from an “increased risk of identity
theft and credit and or debit card fraud.”130 That was enough to clear
the standing bar in New Jersey state court.131
But there was another problem with the suit in New Jersey: personal jurisdiction.132 Now that they were suing outside their home forum, the plaintiffs’ residence was key. The New Jersey court held that
the New York plaintiffs’ claims did not arise out of P.C. Richard & Son’s
contacts with New Jersey.133 As a result, the New Jersey court dismissed the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction over the New Yorkresident defendant.134
123. See O’Shea, 2017 WL 3327602, at *1–2.
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (listing damages that offender may be liable for).
125. O’Shea, 2017 WL 3327602, at *2.
126. See id. at *1.
127. See id. at *8 n.2.
128. See Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Sons, LLC, No. OCN-L-911-18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Jan. 17, 2019). It is not entirely clear from the record in these cases why the New
York plaintiffs did not try their luck in New York state court, which has also rejected
lockstep compliance with federal standing doctrine. Perhaps the plaintiffs were encouraged to sue in New Jersey by that state’s highest court’s almost enthusiastic liberalization of standing doctrine. See, e.g., Jen Elec. Inc. v. Cnty. of Essex, 964 A.2d 790,
801–02 (N.J. 2009) (“New Jersey courts have always employed liberal rules of standing . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty
Equities Corp. of N.Y., 275 A.2d 433, 434 (N.J. 1971) (“New Jersey cases have historically taken a much more liberal approach on the issue of standing than have the federal
cases.”).
129. See Baskin, No. OCN-L-911-18. The New Jersey complaint added a New Jersey
resident as a plaintiff. Id. at 2.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id. at 14.
134. Id.
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This example shows how the viability of federal claims varies
both between federal and state court and among various state courts.
It also shows why plaintiffs cannot simply shop for the friendliest state
forum. The viability of plaintiffs’ claims turned almost entirely on
where they shopped; if they had visited a P.C. Richard & Son store in
New Jersey, their claims might well have succeeded, or at least survived a motion to dismiss. But because they instead shopped in New
York, they could not find a court to vindicate their otherwise meritorious claims.
The example also shows how Spokeo’s progeny have applied the
concreteness requirement to other federal statutory claims. Indeed,
FACTA claims relying on pure procedural injury have been widely dismissed or remanded by federal courts in the wake of Spokeo.135 That
leaves them mostly shut out of federal court.136 Enterprising plaintiffs’
lawyers have already begun testing the fences of state-court standing
rules as applied to FACTA in the wake of Spokeo. And again, state
courts are split on whether to allow them. In North Carolina, the defense bar won a significant victory when a state trial court cited
Spokeo to dismiss FACTA claims for failure to allege injury in fact, despite North Carolina’s more liberal standing doctrine.137 Meanwhile,
in Illinois, an intermediate state appellate court rejected FedEx’s
135. For cases dismissing, see, e.g., Katz v. Donna Karan Co., 872 F.3d 114, 117,
120–21 (2d Cir. 2017); Meyers v. Nicolet Restaurant of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724, 727–
29 (7th Cir. 2016); Hendrick v. Aramark Corp., 263 F. Supp. 3d 514, 520–21 (E.D. Pa.
2017); Stelmachers v. Verifone Systems, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04912, 2016 WL 6835084, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2016); and Kamal v. J. Crew Group, Inc., No. 15-0190, 2016 WL
6133827, at *3–4 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2016). For cases remanding, see, e.g., Collier v. SP Plus
Corp., 889 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2018); Katz v. Six Flags Great Adventure, LLC, No. 18116, 2018 WL 3831337, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2018); and Mocek v. Allsaints USA Ltd.,
220 F. Supp. 3d 910, 915 (N.D. Ill. 2016). Whether to dismiss or remand turns on how
the case got to federal court in the first place: if it was removed by the defendant, remand is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it
appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” (emphasis added)). If the case was originally filed in federal court, dismissal
is required. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). The only difference
for the parties is typically whether the plaintiff has to take affirmative action to refile
in state court.
136. The denial of standing in FACTA cases has not been uniform. See, e.g., Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 905 F.3d 1200, 1211 (11th Cir. 2018) (“When the violation of a statute creates a concrete injury, as it does here, plaintiffs do not need to allege
‘additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.’” (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016))).
137. See Miles v. The Co. Store, No. 16-CVS-2346, slip op. at 2–3 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov.
16, 2017) (“This court agrees that the injury alleged here does not meet the concreteness requirement to establish an injury in fact in order to support standing.”).
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urging in a FACTA case to adopt Spokeo—a significant victory for the
plaintiffs’ bar.138 But just weeks earlier a different panel of the same
court reached the exact opposite conclusion,139 presaging further appellate review.
II. THE PARADOX AND ITS COSTS
This Part examines the costs of relegating certain federal claims
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of only some states. As is
common in federal jurisdiction scholarship, it undertakes an interest
analysis of the potential costs to litigants, as well as to federal law and
the federal judiciary, of relegating a discrete slice of federal claims to
the exclusive jurisdiction of (some) state courts.
Though we don’t yet know how the post-Spokeo map of state
standing doctrine will look, we have already seen different states
reach different conclusions.140 That means many types of FACTA
claims and related statutory-damages suits can be brought only in
state courts, and only in certain states. The only federal review is by
the Supreme Court—and under the Court’s decision in ASARCO, to
which we turn in a moment—this occurs only if the plaintiff wins in
the state supreme court.141 The perverse result is that state courts
have the final say about the meaning of federal law in a considerable
swath of lawsuits brought under federal law. The theoretical oddity of
that state of affairs should already be apparent. What about the practical consequences? To answer that question, we turn to an analysis of
the various stakeholders’ interests.142
138. See Duncan v. FedEx Off. & Print Servs., Inc., 123 N.E.3d 1249, 1257 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2019) (“We find that Duncan has standing to bring her FACTA claim under Illinois
law. In enacting FACTA, Congress elevated intangible harms associated with the printing of more than the last five digits of a person’s card number to the status of legally
cognizable injuries.”).
139. See Paci v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 1-18-0164, 2018 WL 6829148, at *25
(Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 26, 2018) (“Plaintiff only alleged a mere technical violation of FACTA,
which is insufficient to constitute a distinct and palpable injury.” (citing Spokeo, 136 S.
Ct. at 1550)).
140. Compare Kline v. Southgate Prop. Mgmt., 895 N.W.2d 429, 437 n.4 (Iowa
2017) (rejecting Spokeo), with Corozzo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 S.W.3d 566, 574–
76 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (embracing Spokeo).
141. See infra Part II.C.
142. Interest analysis is a useful tool for analyzing questions of case allocation between courts of different sovereigns, including federal and state courts. See, e.g., Gil
Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking Justifications for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 149–58 (2009) (analyzing the question of jurisdictional allocation through the lens of litigant-specific and systemic interests); John F.
Preis, Reassessing the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
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A. PLAINTIFFS’ COSTS
For plaintiffs and prospective plaintiffs, the paradox has three
main costs. First, at the very least, they lose access to the federal forum. Scholars disagree about the relative competence of state versus
federal courts.143 Regardless of general competency, however, federal
judges have more experience and knowledge of, and sympathy for,
247, 292–300 (2007) (assessing sovereign interests in the context of case allocation);
see also Friedman, supra note 5, at 1235 (“[I]nterest analysis is common in federal jurisdiction law and scholarship.”). Of course, interest analysis also plays a key role in
the Erie question of whether state or federal law governs questions of mixed substance
and procedure. See generally Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996)
(seeking to accommodate both federal and state interests); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (balancing state interests against countervailing
federal interests); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION
OF JUDICIAL POWER 189–202 (1980) (“[A] successful Rules of Decision Act balancing test
must carefully identify and assign weight to the federal and state interests to be considered on each side of the balance.”). Finally, interest analysis undergirds the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which seeks somewhat in vain to create a set of
forum-neutral principles for choice-of-law problems. See generally LEA BRILMAYER,
CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS (1991) (charting the history of
conflicts approaches).
143. There is an extensive literature on the degree of parity between state and federal courts at adjudicating federal constitutional claims. Much of that literature discusses whether federal or state courts are superior at protecting individual liberties.
Compare, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1116 n.45
(1977) (arguing that federal courts are superior fora for vindicating civil rights), and
Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 230 n.86 (1985) (arguing that the Framers intended federal courts as the primary guarantors of federal constitutional rights), with
William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599, 607–12
(1999) (arguing that gay rights would never have been expanded to their current ambit absent the availability of litigation in state courts), and Paul M. Bator, The State
Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 622 (1981)
(defending state courts as protectors of federal constitutional rights). For yet a third
perspective, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 236 (1988), which argues that the parity debate “is
an empirical question . . . for which there can never be any meaningful empirical answer” and advocating for a litigant-choice approach to forum selection in federal constitutional cases. See also Burt Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional
Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 730 (1981) (arguing that concurrent jurisdiction
allows litigant choice to select the forum most likely to “enunciate an expansive vision
of the rights of the individual”). Others reject the litigant-choice model in favor of a
congressional control model. See James M. Fischer, Institutional Competency: Some Reflections on Judicial Activism in the Realm of Forum Allocation Between State and Federal
Courts, 34 U. MIA. L. REV. 175, 179 (1980) (“The question of access to a court is a functional component of the demands of our political process. Such a question must address the issue of political responsibility for deciding where certain cases are to be
decided because where cases are decided will often have a profound impact upon how
they are decided.”).
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federal statutory claims—and are collectively better suited to ensure
uniform interpretation of federal laws—than their state counterparts.144 Even those who believe the best approach is one that allows
litigants to choose their jointly preferable forum for litigating federal
claims145 must admit that foreclosing the federal forum altogether entails certain costs.146
Second, and worse, many plaintiffs lack any forum competent to
adjudicate their otherwise meritorious claims. For those plaintiffs
who are (a) injured in states that mirror federal standing rules (b) by
defendants who reside in such states, there is no court able to grant
the relief to which Congress has entitled them. Here the calculus is not
one of forum choice or parity but of raw access to justice. For most
residents of say, North Carolina,147 FACTA’s prohibition on including
full credit card numbers on receipts might as well not exist.
The final cost imposed on plaintiffs derives from the arbitrariness
and uncertainty of making the availability of a remedy for federal statutory grievances turn on state justiciability rules. Most potential
plaintiffs have no idea whether they live in a state that has rejected
144. See Redish & Muench, supra note 103, at 312 (“[S]tate court adjudication of
certain federal causes of action might threaten the evolution of federal rights because
state judges often lack the expertise to deal with problems unique to federal law.”);
Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1774
(1992) (“[A] court’s level of expertise in and familiarity with a sovereign’s body of law
will be in direct proportion to the amount of time it devotes to interpretation of that
law.”); William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise “Directly” Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 893, 906–07, 912 (1967) (discussing
federal courts’ expertise in, and sympathy toward, federal law as a general matter);
AM. L. INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
164–67 (1969) (citing the relatively larger number of writs of certiorari issued to state
courts than lower federal courts in FELA cases, over which state and federal courts had
concurrent jurisdiction, suggesting federal courts had greater expertise in federal law
even where state courts regularly adjudicated federal claims).
145. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 143 (looking at “practical implications” of having federal courts “provide an alternative forum for the vindication of constitutional rights”).
146. The literature on the desirability of general federal-question jurisdiction intones what Gil Seinfeld has called a “bias-uniformity-expertise” mantra. Seinfeld, supra
note 142, at 97 & n.4 (collecting citations); see also David P. Currie, The Federal Courts
and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 268 (1969) (“Federal judges have
relative expertise in dealing with federal law; uniform interpretation is promoted by
federal jurisdiction; state courts may be hostile to federal law.”). The bias-uniformityexpertise line is echoed in the caselaw. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue
Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005).
147. See supra Part I.D. (describing ruling by North Carolina state court adopting
Spokeo as a matter of state law in a FACTA case).
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Lujan and Spokeo in favor of older, more liberal tests. Most people
don’t have the concreteness prong of the injury-in-fact requirement
on the brain when they check their credit report, get a receipt from a
store, or answer a robocall. But whether they can hold credit reporting
agencies, retailers, or phone scammers to account turns on exactly
that. Federal law’s dependence on obscure features of state jurisdiction can also blunt its regulatory power. Even when potential plaintiffs
have access to attorneys who can advise them about where to file, uncertainty about their chosen forum state’s standing rules imposes litigation costs that are a barrier to recovery.
These costs to plaintiffs also should be considered along with recent changes in the law of aggregate litigation that make a plaintiff’s
choice of forum more fraught.148 While once plaintiffs might have been
able to forum-shop for a state court with liberal standing rules, rules
of personal jurisdiction now severely limit that ability. In recent years,
the Supreme Court has narrowed the doctrines of both general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction, restricting plaintiffs’ ability to find a
valid forum in other ways.149 Article III standing therefore joins personal jurisdiction in a pincer action to bar plaintiffs from bringing
many federal statutory claims in any court.
To show plaintiffs’ predicament, recall the P.C. Richard & Son example given in Section D above. Two New York plaintiffs sued in New
York federal court, where they were thrown out on standing
grounds.150 When they sued instead in neighboring New Jersey, their
148. See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, The New Privity (July 2, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3413349 [https://perma.cc/UG9Z-JD52]
(charting changes in the law of personal jurisdiction that effectively reintroduce old
products-liability defenses under the guise of constitutional due process); Adam N.
Steinman, Access to Justice, Rationality, and Personal Jurisdiction, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1401
(2018) (documenting restrictive changes in the law of personal jurisdiction but arguing that avenues to jurisdiction survive); Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth Revolution
in Personal Jurisdiction, 70 FLA. L. REV. 499 (2018) (critiquing these developments in
the law); Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1
(2018) (arguing that personal jurisdiction has arisen as a de facto limitation on aggregate litigation).
149. See generally, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773
(2017) (holding that courts must establish specific personal jurisdiction as to each
plaintiff’s claims in relation to defendant’s contact with the forum state); Daimler AG
v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (effectively limiting the availability of general jurisdiction to forums in which the defendant is incorporated or headquartered); Walden
v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014) (finding that defendant’s knowledge of plaintiffs’ citizenship while committing intentional tort failed to supply the necessary minimum contacts to support specific personal jurisdiction).
150. See O’Shea v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, No. 15-cv-9069, 2017 WL 3327602, at
*3–7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2017).
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claims were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.151 Even if they
had sued in New York state court, there is no guarantee that such
courts would have rejected Spokeo; as we have seen, many state courts
have adopted it, including those who had once rejected Lujan.152 To
find a forum to adjudicate their claims, plaintiffs must parlay an injury
in the right state with successful litigation of the Spokeo issue—two
variables that are unpredictable. That uncertainty—and resulting litigation costs—can be a powerful disincentive to pursuing one’s remedies. In any event, that relief under supposedly nationwide federal law
would turn on such contingent facts undermines two of the animating
purposes of federal regulatory regimes: uniformity and predictability.
B. DEFENDANTS’ COSTS
For defendants, the cost is simple: loss of access to their preferred
forum. As a general rule, corporate defendants prefer to litigate in federal court.153 In cases alleging claims under federal law, the defendant
has the right to remove the case to federal district court so long as the
federal courts have original jurisdiction over the action.154 That is the
primary reason why most federal claims are litigated in federal court:
so long as either the plaintiffs or the defendants prefer to litigate in
federal court, that’s where the case will proceed. By robbing the federal district courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over cases involving
purely procedural statutory violations, Spokeo prohibits defendants
from removing such cases.155
If anyone prefers to litigate in federal court, it is class-action defendants. Indeed, the defense bar lobbied Congress to pass the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, which made it substantially easier for
class-action defendants to remove state-law class actions with minimal diversity.156 And conventional wisdom holds—supported by at
least one empirical study—that if you ask defense attorneys where
they would like to litigate, they will say federal court, while plaintiffs’

151. Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, No. OCN-L-911-18, at *14 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Jan. 17, 2020), aff’d, 228 A.3d 860.
152. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
153. See Flango, supra note 17, at 71.
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
155. See id. § 1447(c) (authorizing district courts to “require payment of just costs
and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal”
if they determine they lack jurisdiction after removal).
156. See, e.g., Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action
Fairness Act on the Federal Courts, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1747–49 (2008) (analyzing
the impact of CAFA on class actions in federal courts).
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attorneys generally prefer state court.157 For that reason, a typical pattern in cases with federal claims or diverse parties is that the plaintiff
chooses to file in state court, and then the defendant removes the case
to federal court. And defendants are generally right to do so: one study
found that defendants were more than twice as likely to win in removed cases as in unremoved cases in both state and federal courts.158
It is deeply ironic that Spokeo bars defendants from removing
many federal consumer class actions. It was defendants who litigated
the issue of Article III standing so vigorously in Spokeo and related
cases. In the Supreme Court, there were ten certiorari-stage briefs
supporting Spokeo, including from the Chamber of Commerce, two of
the three major credit reporting agencies, and a consortium of tech
giants including eBay, Facebook, Google, and Yahoo!.159 The merits
stage added another seven amici supporting Spokeo.160 By contrast,
Robins was supported at the merits stage exclusively by privacy
groups and plaintiffs-side organizations like Public Citizen, Public
Knowledge, NRDC, EPIC, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the American Association for Justice.161
But now defendants are like the dog that caught the car: successful, but surprised and disappointed by the results. Consider the case
of the former stock brokerage Scottrade, which faced multiple federal
class-action suits arising out of a hack of its customer data in 2013.162
Scottrade sought transfer and consolidation before a single Missouri
federal district court.163 That gambit reveals one advantage for defendants of litigating such cases in federal court: ease of centralization
and reduced litigation costs. After consolidation, Scottrade sought

157. See Flango, supra note 17, at 95 & tbl.23 (reporting that roughly 43% of defense-side attorneys across state and federal court cases preferred to litigate in state
court compared to roughly 61% for plaintiff-side attorneys).
158. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 581, 581–82 (1998) (hypothesizing that the explanation for the difference could
either be selection of weak cases for removal or because removal “shift[s] the biases,
inconveniences, court quality, and procedural law in [defendants’] favor”).
159. Docket, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (U.S. May 5, 2014) (listing amicus
briefs).
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See Duqum v. Scottrade, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-1537, 2016 WL 3683001, at *1 (E.D.
Mo. July 12, 2016).
163. See id.
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dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of standing.164 Relying in part
on Spokeo, which was only two months old, the district court granted
the motion and dismissed the cases without prejudice.165 When the
plaintiffs in one of the consolidated cases appealed, the Eighth Circuit
unanimously affirmed, also relying substantially on Spokeo.166
Scottrade’s lawyers likely celebrated, but their celebration was
premature. Two subsets of the losing plaintiffs—those from Florida
and California—refiled identical claims in state court, represented by
the same plaintiffs’ attorneys who had separately appealed to the
Eighth Circuit.167 Scottrade’s first move, like that of most defendants,
was to remove those state class actions to federal court and seek dismissal on res judicata grounds, arguing that the standing issue was already litigated to binding judgment.168 But there was a problem: Scottrade had argued before that federal district courts lacked jurisdiction
to entertain the plaintiffs’ claims. Using Scottrade’s own argument
against it, then, the plaintiffs argued for remand rather than dismissal.169
The results for Scottrade were decidedly mixed. The Florida federal court transferred the case back to Missouri federal court,170 which
dismissed it on res judicata grounds.171 But the California federal
court agreed with the Missouri court that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Rather than dismissing—as the Missouri court had and as Scottrade wanted—the court held that the appropriate remedy was remand,172 thus forcing Scottrade to litigate the issue all over again in
state court. When asked about the result by Reuters, Scottrade’s lead
lawyer replied, “This is one of those times you can say, ‘Hey defendants! Be careful what you ask for.’”173
164. See id. at *2 (arguing that the consolidated complaint should be dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had not suffered an injury in
fact and thus do not have standing under Article III).
165. See id. at *2, *8.
166. See Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711, 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2017).
167. Frankel, supra note 99.
168. See id.
169. See id. (explaining how the plaintiffs successfully argued that once the trial
judge determined they did not have standing to sue in federal court, the judge should
have remanded the class action to state court).
170. See Martin v. Scottrade, Inc., No. 8:17 CV 1042 T-24, 2017 WL 6624136, at *6
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2017).
171. See Martin v. Scottrade, Inc., No. 4:17 CV 2948, 2018 WL 1806696, at *3 (E.D.
Mo. Apr. 17, 2018).
172. See Order Remanding Case, Hine v. Scottrade, Inc., No. 16cv2787, at 4 (S.D. Cal.
Jan. 13, 2017).
173. Frankel, supra note 99.
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Defendants may not even be able to enjoy the biggest benefit of
their efforts to restrict federal standing: the de facto elimination of private statutory causes of action in many states. Because the paradox
creates a kaleidoscope of differentially effective federal regulatory regimes filtered through state jurisdiction, defendants may still need to
comply with federal standards backed by the threat of Spokeo-like
suits rather than face the compliance costs entailed by fifty different
jurisdictions.
C. COSTS TO FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS
The potential costs to the federal judiciary and its ability to superintend the development of federal law are grave. We have federal
courts so that they can provide expert and uniform interpretation of
federal law.174 By shifting so many federal claims to state courts, the
Supreme Court threatens to stymie that purpose. But as with the defendants, the Supreme Court played a key role in the doctrinal developments that created this paradox. For that reason, the Court too must
sleep in the bed it made.
But there is reason to think that the consequences of those decisions were unforeseen and unfortunate. One reason to think the costs
were unforeseen is that neither Spokeo nor Lujan even mentions the
possibility that the types of claims at issue could be brought in state
court. The Court’s focus in both cases was on the consequences for
federal rather than state dockets. As we will see, those unforeseen
costs are dear. And though it is tempting to identify eventual Supreme
Court review as a saving grace, the asymmetric availability of that relief compounds rather than ameliorates the problematic prevailing
law.
1. Federal Law in Federal Courts
Start with the oddity of a rule that relegates federal claims exclusively to state court. The question of case or claim allocation constitutes a primary debate in federal-courts scholarship.175 And, as here,
that debate is mainly one of line-drawing.176 But regardless of one’s
174. See infra notes 182–85.
175. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 143 (discussing the “parity” question:
whether federal courts are more willing and able to protect constitutional rights than
are state courts); Bator, supra note 143 (defending state courts as protectors of federal
constitutional rights).
176. See Bator, supra note 143, at 622 (“[State and federal courts] will continue to
be partners in the task of defining and enforcing federal constitutional principles. The
question remains as to where to draw the lines, but line-drawing is the correct enterprise.”).
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views on the wisdom of various methods of case allocation or the phenomenon of cross-fertilization, no scholar, judge, or lawyer would advocate that the best course is exclusive cross-jurisdictional allocation—the assignment of federal cases solely to state court or viceversa. Rather, the debates focus on whether federal cases should be
heard by state courts simultaneously or never.177
The notion that law should be shaped at least mainly by the courts
of the sovereign that promulgates it is orthodoxy, with good reason.178
The proposition that federal courts should not decide novel issues of
state law is so sacred that it is typically proffered without citation.179
The converse—that state courts should not be tasked with issuing
new interpretations of federal law—is similarly self-evident.180 Those
177. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the
Federal Courts, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1409, 1411, 1467–68 (1999) [hereinafter Schapiro,
Polyphonic Federalism] (advocating the adjudication of state constitutional issues by
federal courts as a means to facilitate development of the law); Geri J. Yonover, A
Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use of Certification, 47 ARK. L. REV. 305, 337–39
(1994) (cataloguing advantages of cross-jurisdictional decision-making); Ann Althouse, How To Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1485, 1505–06 n.116 (1987) (arguing that state decisions on federal law can “inform and enrich” the ultimate uniform interpretation of those laws by the Supreme
Court); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the
Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 386 (1980) (“Contrary to the conventional
view, we find that the federal courts in diversity cases appear to make a significant
contribution to the continuing development of the common law.” (citation omitted)).
178. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 1236 (“One is likely to find little disagreement
with the proposition that ceteris paribus it is better for a sovereign’s own courts to
resolve novel or unsettled questions regarding that sovereign’s laws.”); Redish, supra
note 144 (“[I]t makes practical sense for a sovereign’s courts to have primary responsibility for adjudication of that sovereign’s law.”); Philip Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 487
(1960) (“I start with the principle that the federal courts are the primary experts on
national law just as the State courts are the final expositors of the laws of their respective jurisdictions.”). For judicial opinions expressing the same sentiment, see, for example, England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415–16
(1964), which notes the abstention doctrine’s “recognition of the role of state courts
as the final expositors of state law implies no disregard for the primacy of the federal
judiciary in deciding questions of federal law.”
179. See Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1293, 1300 (2003) (“The problem here is that federal courts often get
state law wrong because federal judges don’t know state law and are not the ultimate
decisionmakers on it.”); Ann Althouse, The Authoritative Lawsaying Power of the State
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court: Conflicts of Judicial Orthodoxy in
the Bush-Gore Litigation, 61 MD. L. REV. 508, 516 (2002) (“It is axiomatic that the state
court has final authority over the interpretation of a state’s law.”); see also Friedman,
supra note 5, at 1237 n.64 (collecting examples of the proposition given without supporting authority by scholars and the Supreme Court).
180. See, e.g., LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 91 (1994)
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scholars who advocate for cross-jurisdictional models do so because
cross-fertilization contributes to the development of the other sovereign’s law, not because it should usurp it altogether.181 But as we have
seen, the current state of the law threatens to assign a discrete class
of federal claims exclusively to state court, frustrating both the benefits of the federal sovereign’s control over its own law and the possibility of cross-fertilization in one go.
The observation that relegating federal claims exclusively to state
court is bad for the development of federal law does not depend on a
claim that state courts would, on average, reach substantively bad decisions. So long as state courts potentially reach different conclusions
about how to interpret federal law, the damage will have been done,
and the real victim will be the uniformity of federal law. Indeed, Alexander Hamilton described the notion that state courts might have exclusive final jurisdiction over federal claims as “a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can
proceed.”182 Relying on that same passage, Chief Justice Marshall
noted that “the necessity of uniformity . . . suggest[s] the propriety of
vesting in some single tribunal the power of deciding, in the last resort, all cases” involving federal law.183 More recent efforts to evaluate
the allocation of cases as between state and federal courts have
reached the same conclusion. The American Law Institute’s landmark
1969 study on the topic concluded that “greater uniformity results
(discussing how actions “arising under” federal law should be channeled to the federal
forum); REDISH, supra note 142, at 3 (“It seems intuitively appropriate to provide federal courts the primary responsibility for adjudicating federal law, and leave as the primary function of state courts the defining and expounding of state policies and principles.”); Kurland, supra note 178 (“I start with the principle that the federal courts are
the primary experts on national law just as the State courts are the final expositors of
the laws of their respective jurisdictions.”).
181. See, e.g., Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism, supra note 177, at 1417 (“Federal
adjudication of state constitutional claims contributes to the development of state constitutional law, while at the same time avoiding a federal constitutional ruling that
would end any chance for further dialogue on important constitutional matters.”); David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV.
317, 324–27 (1977) (explaining how “federal courts, through diversity jurisdiction,
are seen to be contributing to the development of state law”); Robert M. Cover & T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J.
1035, 1046–68 (1977) (describing a “model of federal-state interaction . . . premised
upon conflict and indetermina[]cy” that “obtains whenever jurisdictional rules link
state and federal tribunals and create areas of overlap in which neither system can
claim total sovereignty”).
182. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 475–80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Glazier, Masters &
Smith eds., 1837).
183. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 415–16 (1821).
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from hearing [federal] cases in a federal court” and that “lack of uniformity in the application of federal law . . . would be less in the federal
courts than in the state courts.”184 Thus, if such uniformity is a primary
goal not just of federal courts but also of federal law itself, the present
paradox strikes at the very legitimacy of Article III courts.185
2. Uniformity and the Limits of Supreme Court Review
Even if one is skeptical of the intrinsic value of uniformity, disuniformity carries instrumental costs.186 For example, companies and individuals subject to competing interpretations of federal law will incur considerable costs to comply with conflicting regulations. They
will also face substantial legal and compliance costs from the unpredictability that would attend fifty-one interpretations of federal statutes. Those costs would be magnified by the incentives for both
184. AM. L. INST., supra note 144, at 165–66.
185. On the centrality of the uniformity goal to the work of federal courts as expressed by the Supreme Court, see, for example, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826 (1986), noting that the Judiciary Act of 1875 created federal-question jurisdiction out of recognition of “the importance, and even necessity of
uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States” (quoting Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816)); Grable & Sons Metal Products
Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005), noting the “hope
of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues”; and Kansas v. Marsh, 548
U.S. 163, 183 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring), stating, “Our principal responsibility under
current practice, however, and a primary basis for the Constitution’s allowing us to be
accorded jurisdiction to review state-court decisions, see Art. III, § 2, cls. 1 and 2, is to
ensure the integrity and uniformity of federal law.”
Scholars sing the same tune. See Bator, supra note 143, at 635 (noting the need for
federal appellate review of state court judgments on questions of federal law because
“[p]rovision must be made for uniform and authoritative pronouncements of federal
law”); Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (1994) (“Both the Constitution’s framers and the Supreme Court have stressed that the articulation of nationally uniform
interpretations of federal law is an important objective of the federal adjudicatory process.” (footnotes omitted)); Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of
the Federal Courts, 1990 BYU L. REV. 67, 83–85 (asserting the centrality of the goal of
“uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal law” to the existence of federal courts); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking
System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1155 (1990) (describing uniformity of federal law as
“a generally undisputed goal”); Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking
Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2006) (identifying the Supreme Court’s two principal objectives as: “(i) to resolve important questions of law and (ii) to maintain uniformity in federal law”). But see Amanda Frost,
Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008) (questioning the value of uniform
interpretation of federal statutory law).
186. See Caminker, supra note 185 (listing “uniformity” values that could be lost
through disuniformity, such as predictable legal obligations and social norms).
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plaintiffs and defendants to shop for favorable forums and to race to
preclusive judgments. Finally, there is a certain unfairness associated
with unequal treatment of similarly situated litigants only because of
jurisdictional rules over which they have no control.
Oddly, the possibility of eventual Supreme Court review does not
solve the problem, for two reasons. First, Supreme Court review is
sharply limited as a mechanism for fostering uniformity. Even if certiorari were a perfect tool for disciplining the application of federal law
by lower courts, the sharp decline in the number of cases the Court
hears each term imposes structural limits on the amount of uniformity
that the Court can impose.187 And even when the Court grants review,
it often generates more uncertainty than it resolves.188
Second, the Supreme Court is restricted in its ability to ensure
uniformity in these kinds of cases because it can only take them on
appeal if the plaintiff won in state court below.189 This odd asymmetry
derives from the Court’s attempt to grapple with its own Article III
justiciability limitations, even though the state courts it reviews follow
different rules. In a pair of cases, the Court addressed whether, when
cases involving plaintiffs who lack Article III standing appear on its
appellate docket, it can hear the case. By giving seemingly contradictory answers in those two cases—Doremus v. Board of Education190
and ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish191—the Court established asymmetric appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments involving federal questions.192 On their facts, Doremus and ASARCO are essentially indistinguishable.193 The only difference between them was who won below:
187. Cf. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Declining Plenary Docket: A Membership-Based Explanation, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 151, 161 (2010) (speculating that changes
in Court composition led to a decrease in the number of cases heard each year).
188. For example, the Court issued opinions regarding the meaning of the Armed
Career Criminal Act’s residual clause in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2015. See Johnson
v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015); Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008);
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007). Even after striking the entire clause down
as unconstitutional, the cases kept multiplying. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204
(2018); Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019); United States v. Stitt, 139 S.
Ct. 399 (2018).
189. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
190. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
191. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
192. Id.
193. In Doremus, plaintiffs suing as taxpayers sought a declaratory judgment that
a New Jersey law requiring the reading of a Bible passage at the beginning of the public-school day violated the Establishment Clause. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 430. Likewise,
in ASARCO, plaintiffs suing as taxpayers sought a declaratory judgment striking down
an Arizona statute governing mineral leases. ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 610.
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in Doremus, the defendants won below and the plaintiffs appealed; in
ASARCO, the plaintiffs won below and the defendants appealed.194 Yet
the cases came out the opposite way: in Doremus, the Court held it
lacked jurisdiction for want of standing; in ASARCO, the Court held that
it had jurisdiction despite plaintiffs’ lack of standing.195 The rule established by these two cases is that, when the plaintiff lacks Article III
standing, Supreme Court review is available only if the plaintiff won in
the state court below.196 The asymmetry goes beyond plaintiffs and
defendants to affect the scope of federal rights. Generally, the Supreme
Court can only review cases in which the state court has expanded the
scope of the federal right, because that is typically what happens when
a plaintiff vindicates a federal claim. The Court’s asymmetric jurisdiction thus ensures that its already-limited supervisory power is also
structurally biased against expansive readings of federal law, at least
to the extent that the Court is more likely to reverse than affirm when
it grants certiorari.197 Making matters worse, the jurisdictional thicket
that inheres in the tension between these cases makes it unlikely the
Supreme Court will soon resolve this asymmetry.

194. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 430–31; ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 610.
195. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 434–35; ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 633. In ASARCO, the Supreme Court dodged the precedent of Doremus by identifying a novel injury to support
its own jurisdiction to hear the case: the adverse judgment below suffered by the petitioner-defendant. ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 618–19; see id. at 634 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“The Court justifies the result it reaches by saying that
the state-court judgment adverse to petitioners is itself a form of ‘injury’ which supplies Article III standing.”). Because the judgment against the defendants rested on an
allegedly “erroneous interpretation of federal statutes” and inflicted concrete injury
upon them, the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction was proper. Id. at 618–19 (majority
opinion). In essence, the Court treated the petition for certiorari as the invocation of
federal jurisdiction and thus tested the petitioner’s injury against Article III.
196. See Hall, supra note 9, at 1272–78 (tracing the development of this asymmetry); see also Schapiro, supra note 9, at 304 (“Thus, if a non-Article III plaintiff receives an adverse judgment on a matter of federal law, no Supreme Court review is
available. In this situation, the state court’s interpretation of federal law is final and
unreviewable.”).
197. The asymmetry is also contrary to original practice under the Constitution.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 limited Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction only over state
court judgments denying a federal claim of right. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1
Stat. 73, 85–87; cf. Hall, supra note 9, at 1291 (arguing that the Supreme Court should
return to the original understanding of its appellate jurisdiction as extending to all
state-court judgments adverse to a federal claim of right).

1250

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:1211

3. Article III as a Backdoor Limit on Congress’s Regulatory
Authority
Finally, even if Supreme Court review were effective and available in all cases, the paradox would still pose a formidable problem for
the traditional understanding of the relationship between Congress
and the federal courts. Because it deprives Congress of a federal forum
for adjudication of statutory claims, Article III standing doctrine has
been criticized as a backdoor limitation on Congress’s Article I power
to legislate.198 But that criticism has always been subject to the rejoinder that, in many cases, state courts remain competent to adjudicate
federal claims even outside Article III’s jurisdictional limitations. Only
by understanding how state courts often voluntarily adopt federal
standing doctrine can we appreciate the full brunt of this criticism of
the restrictive turn in Article III standing doctrine.
In sum, the costs of the paradox of exclusive state-court jurisdiction over certain federal claims are significant, growing, and fall not
only on both plaintiffs and defendants, but also on federal law itself.
Those costs provide a clear benchmark—and a substantial obstacle—
for any potential solution to the problem.
III. CONCRETE STEPS TO RESOLVE THE PARADOX
As Part II made clear, the paradox created by Lujan and Spokeo
imposes substantial costs. As it happens, however, there is no easy
way out of the paradox because any solution must balance five different substantive principles of judicial federalism and the separation of
powers. After setting out those principles, this Part examines four possible solutions.
A. CORE PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Five core principles of federal jurisdiction are implicated by the
Spokeo paradox.
198. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1170–71 (1993) (calling Lujan
“an insupportable judicial contraction of the legislative power to make judicially enforceable policy decisions”); see also id. at 1199 (“The majority opinion in Defenders
transposes a doctrine of judicial restraint into a judicially enforced doctrine of congressional restraint.”); John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42
DUKE L.J. 1219, 1226 (1993) (“If Congress directs the federal courts to hear a case in
which the requirements of Article III are not met, that Act of Congress is unconstitutional. . . . [B]ut the conclusion that Article III limits congressional power can hardly be
regarded as remarkable.”); Fletcher, supra note 30, at 233 (arguing that standing doctrine operates to “limit the power of Congress to define and protect against certain
kinds of injury that the Court thinks it improper to protect against”).
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First is the notion of legislative supremacy, the idea that Congress
enacts the content of statutory law and that judges are constrained by
that content.199 In the language of economics, this principle maintains
that “[j]udges must be honest agents of the political branches.”200 At
the very least, legislative supremacy requires judges not to contradict
clear statutory text. To be consistent with this principle, any solution
to the paradox must avoid eliminating, altering, or adding elements to
a congressionally enacted statutory cause of action.
Second, any solution to the paradox must respect the distinction
between jurisdiction and a decision on the merits.201 In the traditional
formulation in federal courts, jurisdiction is about the power of the
court to issue a judgment in a particular dispute, while merits is about
whether a claimant’s asserted legal right is valid. Many consequences
flow from the jurisdiction-merits characterization, the most notable of
which here are that jurisdictional elements are unwaivable and, at
least in theory, must be raised by the court sua sponte if unaddressed
by the parties.202 To track the distinction between jurisdiction and
merits, then, a solution to the paradox should avoid treating Article III

199. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy,
78 GEO. L.J. 281, 281 (1989) (“It is a commonplace that, apart from constitutional issues, judges are subordinate to legislatures in the making of public policy.”). But see
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 322 (1989)
(challenging a thoroughgoing view of legislative supremacy).
200. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 60 (1984).
201. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55,
56 (2008) (“[W]hether a particular question is jurisdictional or not means a great deal.
The problem is that determining whether a particular issue is jurisdictional is often
difficult.”); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 662
(2005) (“Two consequences flow from the characterization of a particular fact as jurisdictional or merits-related. The first is procedural—the time and manner in which
that fact is resolved in the adjudicative process. The second is formalist—Congress
treats jurisdiction and merits differently in its various statutory enactments and, in a
formalist framework, distinct concepts should be addressed in a distinct manner.”
(footnotes omitted)). But see Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1622 (2003) (“Jurisdiction is ultimately about the legitimacy of any
resulting judgment, whether we want to speak of normative legitimacy or sociological
legitimacy. The merits are also ultimately about the legitimacy of any resulting judgment. There is nothing about either one that necessarily sets it apart from the other.”
(footnotes omitted)).
202. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (“[C]ourts . . . have an
independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even
in the absence of a challenge from any party.”); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (“[A] court . . . will raise lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction on its own motion.”).
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standing, a jurisdictional requirement, as an element of the statutory
cause of action, a merits requirement.203
The third principle is the one that traditionally animates federal
standing doctrine: the federal judiciary can only decide actual controversies.204 This limit derives from federal separation-of-powers principles.205 Translating those abstract principles into concrete guidance
is difficult, but standing may be taken broadly to promote the separation of powers by limiting the judicial branch to its appropriate role,
both in terms of institutional competency and in terms of not intruding on the traditional bailiwick of the other branches.206 Respect for
this principle therefore demands that the federal judiciary not be
tasked with deciding insufficiently adversarial disputes or engaging in
quasi-legislative or quasi-executive action.
The fourth principle implicated by the paradox is the distinct sovereignty of the states, which are free to create their own schemes of
separated power.207 State sovereignty is not mere formalism; it is one
essential half of the “double security” promised by our structural, constitutional order.208 The independence of the states in general and
their judiciaries in particular is an important facet of the separation of
powers.209 For example, state courts have always served as the lone
203. Cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93 (1998) (accusing the
dissent of “attempt[ing] to convert the merits issue in this case into a jurisdictional
one”).
204. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (“Article III of the Constitution
confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’”).
205. See id. at 752; Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 n.3 (1996) (identifying that
the “actual injury” requirement encourages separation of powers).
206. See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, The Separation-of-Powers Theory of Standing, 95
N.C. L. REV. 673, 684–85 (2017) (cataloging four justifications for standing doctrine derived from separation of powers); Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 459, 468 (2008) (documenting three categories of separation-of-powers justifications for standing doctrine); Scalia, supra note 23, at 892–93 (arguing that liberalized standing alters the relationships among the coordinate federal branches).
207. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3 (1998) (“[I]t is the
state constitution—and not the federal Constitution—that creates the state government, largely determines the scope of its powers, and distributes those powers among
the branches of the state government and between state and locality.”); see also ALBERT
L. STURM, THIRTY YEARS OF STATE CONSTITUTION-MAKING: 1938–1968, at 6 (1970)
(“[W]riters of state charters are relatively free to prescribe the structure and authority
of state organs.”).
208. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
209. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency’s New Vestments, 88 NW. U.
L. REV. 1346, 1357 (1994) (illustrating how interbranch federal conflicts are mitigated
by the existence of state courts); see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 500–03 (2012) (highlighting
how states’ prerogatives enforce the separation of powers).
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valid forum for vindicating federal law when Congress has failed to
vest in lower federal courts the maximum of federal jurisdiction permitted under Article III. State court independence is made possible because states are free to establish their own systems of separated powers,210 including by “establish[ing] the structure and jurisdiction of
their own courts” and “apply[ing] their own neutral procedural rules
to federal claims.”211 As relevant here, due respect for states’ separate
sovereignty means heeding state courts’ unique roles within both the
states’ own systems of separated powers and the larger federal system.
The fifth and final consideration is the constitutional role of the
Supreme Court as the ultimate adjudicator of questions of federal law.
Ensuring uniformity of federal law has always been the chief justification for the existence not only of federal judicial power in general but
also the Supreme Court in particular.212 Due respect for this constitutional role demands that the Supreme Court have jurisdiction at least
to hear every type of federal claim, if not every case implicating federal
law. Ideally, the selection of cases for such review would not be systematically biased in ways that would tend to expand or contract the

210. See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902) (“Whether the legislative, executive and judicial powers of a State shall be kept altogether distinct and separate . . . is
for the determination of the State.”); Hershkoff, supra note 14, at 1884–86 (describing
the variation in state separation of powers). Some commentators argue that the federal
Constitution requires some minimum scheme of state separated powers, but they do
not contend that any states’ schemes fall below that minimum. See Michael C. Dorf, The
Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
51, 58 (1998) (arguing that a principle requiring separation of state government powers can be inferred from the Constitution); Louis H. Pollak, Judicial Power and “The Politics of the People,” 72 YALE L.J. 81, 88 (1962) (postulating that, although the Constitution does not require state governments to mirror the federal structure, the
Constitution implies that an “idea” of the three branches must exist at the state level).
211. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954) (“The general
rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.”).
212. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 182, at 476 (“The mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws, decides the question. Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws,
is a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.”); see also Charles E. Grassley, The Role of the Supreme Court, 26 U. RICH. L. REV.
449, 449 (1992) (“The most important reason to have a Supreme Court is to ensure
uniformity in the law.”). See generally discussion supra note 185 (collecting authority
for the proposition that ensuring uniformity of federal law is central to the work of
federal courts).
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ambit of federal law—e.g., in favor of only plaintiffs or defendants.213
Any solution to the paradox ought therefore to permit the Supreme
Court to eliminate variations in federal law from one state to the next
without requiring it to ratchet federal law in only one direction.
Using these principles as lodestars, the rest of this Part evaluates
four possible ways to solve the problem identified in Part II.
B. REQUIRE STATE COURTS TO APPLY ARTICLE III STANDING WHEN
ADJUDICATING FEDERAL CLAIMS
The first proposal in the scholarly literature is to have state
courts follow Article III standing doctrine, at least when adjudicating
federal claims.214 Proponents of this approach include Paul Freund,
Judge William Fletcher, and Michael Morley, though each advocated
for it decades apart.215 Their proposal has one clear advantage: it

213. Cf. Maxwell Mak, Andrew H. Sidman & Udi Sommer, Is Certiorari Contingent
on Litigant Behavior? Petitioners’ Role in Strategic Auditing, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
54, 66–72 (2013) (documenting selection bias in certiorari process attributable to litigant incentives); Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Ducking Trouble: Congressionally Induced Selection Bias in the Supreme Court’s Agenda, 71 J. POL. 574, 578–90 (2009) (documenting selection bias in certiorari process attributable to Court’s desire to avoid
congressional retribution).
214. See Fletcher, supra note 9, at 265 (“In this article, I propose a more thoroughgoing reform: State courts should be required to adhere to article III ‘case or controversy’ requirements whenever they adjudicate questions of federal law.”); Paul A.
Freund, The Supreme Court, 1951 Term—Foreword: The Year of the Steel Case, 66 HARV.
L. REV. 89, 95 (1952) (“Would it not be sounder practice in such cases [as Doremus] to
treat the standing of the complainants as itself a federal question . . . ?”); Morley, supra
note 9, at 596–603 (identifying three reasons why state courts “should presume that
causes of action created by federal statutes are limited to litigants with Article III
standing”); Ralph F. Bischoff, Status to Challenge Constitutionality, in SUPREME COURT
AND SUPREME LAW 26, 35 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1954) (transcribing the remarks of Professor Paul Freund during a discussion of Doremus); William P. Murphy, Supreme Court
Review of Abstract State Court Decisions on Federal Law: A Justiciability Analysis, 25 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 473, 498 (1981) (“[J]usticiability of all federal issues in state or federal
courts should be controlled by article III principles.”); Jonathan D. Varat, Variable Justiciability and the Duke Power Case, 58 TEX. L. REV. 273, 311–13 (1980) (discussing the
strengths of “Professor Freund’s appealing suggestion that the Court should vacate
state court decisions of federal law rendered in non-article III proceedings”); Katz, supra note 9, at 1317 (“[S]tate courts should abide by federal standing requirements to
enforce federal causes of action consistently with federal courts.”). But see Elmendorf,
supra note 9, at 1006–08 (arguing against such a proposal in the context of federal
environmental law); Stern, supra note 9, at 94 (“[A]ltering state standing rules would
change how responsibility is divided between the coordinate branches of the state government.”).
215. See sources cited supra note 214. Judge Fletcher and Professor Freund were
spurred to the suggestion by the decisions in ASARCO and Doremus, respectively. See
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eliminates the phenomenon of federal claims that can be brought only
in state courts. By creating parity in standing law across federal and
state courts, plaintiffs and defendants would theoretically be indifferent about where they litigated the standing issue. Further, because the
standards would be identical, a judgment concerning standing in federal court would be preclusive in state court, and vice versa. The proposal cuts the paradox’s Gordian knot cleanly.
Yet this proposal’s efficacy in resolving the paradox comes at a
substantial cost to litigants because it ensures that despite clear congressional intent to the contrary, plaintiffs who suffer purely statutory
violations will be without a valid forum for suit. For that reason, any
solution that eliminates the state forum threatens to transform Article
III from a self-enforced limitation on the power of the judiciary into a
limitation on the legislative power of Congress enforced by the judicial
branch.216 Even before analyzing this proposal on its own terms, then,
we should ask whether resolving the paradox is worth nullifying otherwise valid statutory claims.
Even if those larger concerns could be met, the details pose more
intractable problems. In particular, how are we to compel a state court
to change its jurisdiction to accommodate shrinking federal jurisdiction? Consider the possible sources for a rule that states should be
bound by Article III standing rules when adjudicating federal claims:
Article III itself, statutory text or interpretation, federal common law,
or state law. Each of those possibilities is dubious as a matter of existing law and infringes one of the structural values identified above.
1. Article III
The first possible source for a rule requiring state courts to apply
federal standing doctrine when adjudicating federal claims is Article
III itself. Judge Fletcher’s article comes closest to this view.217 Though
he does not focus on the precise source of authority to impose the
case-or-controversy requirement on state courts, he advocates for
“the Supreme Court to recognize . . . the values served by the ‘case or
controversy’ doctrine, and by Supreme Court review of state court

Fletcher, supra note 9, at 264 (citing ASARCO); Freund, supra note 214 (citing Doremus).
216. See Pierce, supra note 198, at 1179 (analyzing Lujan and determining that Article III standing has been transformed into “a judicially enforceable limit on congressional discretion”).
217. See Fletcher, supra note 9, at 294–302 (discussing the implementation of a
common case-or-controversy standard).
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decisio[ns] on questions of federal law, [and to] require the adoption
of” such doctrine by state courts.218
Judge Fletcher’s argument is based in history and policy. He begins with the historical claim that there was a long period—from the
founding through the end of the nineteenth century—during which
there was no practical difference in federal and state standing law.219
Then, around the turn of the twentieth century, he identifies a change
characterized by cases like Doremus, reflecting a gap between state
and federal standing.220 In the second half of the twentieth century,
however, he claims that there was a convergence between federal and
state practice, which resulted in ASARCO’s restoring partial Supreme
Court review of state court judgments even when the plaintiff lacked
Article III standing.221 Given that historical background, Judge
Fletcher argues for applying Article III standing for three reasons: (1)
to ensure quality of adjudication through adversariness; (2) to restore
the Supreme Court’s role as final adjudicator of questions of federal
law; and (3) because doing so would treat state and federal courts “as
genuine partners in the business of adjudicating federal law.”222
Though he admits his proposal entails certain costs—most notably,
the undermining of state court autonomy—he generally dismisses the
idea that imposing Article III on state courts is any worse than imposing substantive federal law on state courts as a rule of decision
through the Supremacy Clause.223
If we take Judge Fletcher to suggest that the text and history of
Article III compel state courts to adopt the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the case-or-controversy language, we must confront that text
and history. As discussed in Section I.B above, the text of Article III by
its terms applies only to the judicial power “of the United States”224—
i.e., federal courts. Article III only vests that judicial power in “one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.”225 It is hard to understand how the
limitations on that judicial power embodied in the case-or218. Id. at 303.
219. See id. at 267–69.
220. See id. at 275–79.
221. See id. at 281–82.
222. See id. at 282–84.
223. See id. at 286–87.
224. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
225. Id.; see William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1511,
1525 (2020) (“State courts exercise the judicial power of their respective states, and
this is perfectly square with the text of Article III, which regulates only ‘[t]he judicial
power of the United States.’”).
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controversy requirement could be imposed on constitutional actors in
whom such power has not been vested. Any argument that Article III
applies to states as a constitutional matter must confront those textual
hurdles but seems overmatched to do so.
Moving beyond text to structural considerations reveals further
difficulty. Most importantly, no other part of Article III applies to state
courts. State judges are not guaranteed life tenure during periods of
good behavior, nor does Article III’s jury-guarantee—rather than
those in the Sixth and Seventh Amendments—apply in state courts.226
Indeed, the Supreme Court has generally rejected attempts to require
federal law to carry with it to state courts unincorporated procedural
rules.227 Judge Fletcher anticipates this problem and argues that imposing Article III on state courts is no worse than imposing the Supremacy Clause on them or depriving them of jurisdiction through legislative specification of exclusive federal jurisdiction.228 Yet while it is
possible to imagine a different constitutional structure and history imposing Article III on the states, there is no proof of such application
under the existing scheme of judicial federalism.
The proposal to use Article III to regulate state separation of powers also violates the fourth structural principle identified above: due
respect for states as separate sovereigns. If this principle is worth valuing—for example, because states have their own institutions, political traditions, constituencies, and judicial competencies—abrogating
it to make state courts mirror federal ones conflicts with those values.
The independence of state courts from federal courts is the key premise of judicial federalism. To abolish that difference is in many ways to
abolish the structural separateness of state courts.

226. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, at 503–05 (describing the current state of incorporation doctrine as being limited to the Bill of Rights).
227. See Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 221 (1916) (rejecting argument that a FELA action in state court must be tried to a jury, on grounds
that state “courts in enforcing the Federal right are [not] to be treated as Federal courts
and be subjected pro hac vice to the limitations of the Seventh Amendment”).
228. See Fletcher, supra note 9, at 286–87 (“Preventing the state courts from deciding disputes is less offensive to state sovereignty than requiring them to decide disputes that they would otherwise decline to hear. For example, we do not consider it an
interference with state court autonomy when federal statutes confer exclusive rather
than concurrent jurisdiction on the federal courts, thereby forbidding the state courts
to decide cases coming within the exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the federal
courts.”).
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2. Statutory Text or Interpretation
Statutory text and interpretation offer no more support for the
idea that state courts should be bound by federal standing doctrine
when adjudicating federal claims. A statutory interpretation approach
would involve reading federal standing doctrine into all federal causes
of action as an element of the claim.229 Indeed, at least one state court
has already, though perhaps erroneously, taken this approach.230 Yet,
as a textual matter, no federal statutes require proof of Article III
standing as an element of the cause of action on the merits. And as
discussed in Section I.B above, where Congress is silent on the issue,
an established presumption supports concurrent jurisdiction, and
Congress has long legislated against that background presumption.231
So for the vast majority of statutory claims, there is every reason to
believe Congress intended to allow suit in state courts with liberal
standing regimes. In any event, there is little reason to believe that
Congress intended to include federal standing doctrine as an element
of statutory causes of action or that Congress’s legislative power is so
limited.232
Against this view, Michael Morley has recently argued that, despite the lack of statutory text requiring federal standing doctrine in
state courts, federal courts should still read federal statutes creating
229. Such a shift would subtly alter how the issue would be litigated in state court,
as it could be raised by defendants in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (or
an analogous procedure) rather than in a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. But the differences—most notably the possibility of waiver—would be
minor.
230. See Navigators Ins. Co. v. Sterling Infosystems, Inc., 42 N.Y.S.3d 813, 814 (App.
Div. 2016) (treating standing as a requirement “[t]o make out a claim under the
FCRA”).
231. See discussion supra Part I.B; see, e.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494
U.S. 820, 823 (1990) (“To give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over a federal cause
of action, Congress must . . . affirmatively divest state courts of their presumptively
concurrent jurisdiction.”); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 636 (1884) (“In establishing
[federal courts], Congress has taken care not to exclude the jurisdiction of the state
courts from every case to which, by the constitution, the judicial power of the United
States extends.”); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) (“State courts can exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal courts . . . where it is not excluded by express provision, or by incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular case.”).
232. Some commentators believe existing federal standing law does just that. See
Pierce, supra note 198 (calling Lujan “an insupportable judicial contraction of the legislative power to make judicially enforceable policy decisions”); see also id. at 1199
(“The majority opinion in Defenders transposes a doctrine of judicial restraint into a
judicially enforced doctrine of congressional restraint.”). That critique, however, gives
short shrift to the role of state courts. But if we extended federal standing doctrine to
the states, the criticism would obtain entirely.
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actions involving statutory damages to include federal standing doctrine as an element of the cause of action.233 His argument has two
prongs. First, he argues that because the exercise of jurisdiction by Article III courts over Spokeo-type claims would pose a constitutional
problem, the constitutional-avoidance canon warrants limiting statutory-damages claims on the merits to plaintiffs who would have Article III standing.234 Second, he argues that the broad grant of federalquestion jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 should be read to create a presumption against interpreting any federal law as authorizing a cause
of action outside the district courts’ jurisdiction.235
Neither argument has merit. The constitutional-avoidance argument depends on the incorrect assumption that the creation of a federal cause of action outside the jurisdiction of the federal district
courts is itself unconstitutional. But it is not the creation of the cause
of action that would be the constitutional problem; it is the federal
court’s proceeding to judgment that must be avoided. If federal courts
dismiss Spokeo-type claims, there is no constitutional problem. And
absent a constitutional problem, there is no reason to frustrate the
clear congressional intent to remedy the harm targeted by the creation of the statutory right. Yet closing state courts to Spokeo-type
claims does just that.
The argument that general federal-question jurisdiction creates
a presumption that Article III standing doctrine should apply as an element of federal statutory causes of action is even less persuasive, for
reasons of both constitutional history and precedent. As a matter of
history, the argument seems implausible because the grant of federalquestion jurisdiction came slowly and in parts. For example, with limited exceptions, there was no general federal question jurisdiction before 1875.236 Even then, it was subject to a substantial amount-in-controversy requirement, which was jurisdictional and not eliminated
until 1980.237 Before then, it was clear that wide swaths of federal
claims were intended by Congress to be heard in state court.238 So
233. Morley, supra note 9, at 585 (“[C]ourts should not interpret federal laws authorizing statutory damages as creating causes of action for quasi-Hohfeldian plaintiffs
in any court, absent a clear statement in the statutory text or legislative history to the
contrary.”).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
237. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486,
94 Stat. 2369.
238. See id. (noting that eliminating the amount-in-controversy requirement
would allow many more federal question cases to be heard in federal court).
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when, as a matter of history, did Professor Morley’s proposed presumption take effect? Not in 1789, when the entire edifice of federal
statutory law depended on state courts for enforcement.239 Nor could
it plausibly be in 1875, when small-dollar federal claims were intended to be state-court actions.240 Perhaps it arose in 1980, upon the
elimination of the federal-question amount-in-controversy requirement.241 But if so, it is not clear why courts should apply that new presumption to statutes that were enacted before 1980—such as FCRA,
the statute at issue in Spokeo—which was first enacted in 1970.242
As a matter of constitutional precedent, a presumption against
state jurisdiction over federal claims is not only novel but also inconsistent with the strong presumption in favor of concurrent state jurisdiction. Since at least 1876, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that only express statutory text or direct conflict between federal and
state jurisdiction can unseat the presumption that state courts can
hear federal claims.243 Professor Morley’s proposed presumption
would therefore be both a counter-presumption and an exception to
the longstanding view that state courts may hear federal claims. Without some change in the law or indication from the Supreme Court or
Congress, there is little basis to invent new presumptions that upset
the balance of judicial federalism.
Reading additional doctrinal elements into statutory causes of action also conflicts with the first principle outlined above: legislative
supremacy, or the idea that courts should act as faithful agents of legislatures when reading statutes. It is one thing for federal courts to
abnegate power to hear cases outside their jurisdiction. Indeed,
judges denying themselves the power to hear cases out of due respect
for the appropriately limited role of the federal judiciary has a long
and proud tradition.244 But it is quite another thing for those same
239. Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV.
45, 56 (1975) (“The possibility that Congress would decide not to create lower federal
courts was naturally inherent in the Madisonian Compromise. Thus it presumably was
Madison’s view—as it clearly was Rutledge’s—that in such an event state courts would
be able to provide adequate remedies to litigants with federal claims.”).
240. See Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, § 1 (creating general federal question jurisdiction subject to an amount-in-controversy requirement of more than $500).
241. See Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980 (abolishing the
amount-in-controversy requirement for all federal-question cases).
242. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016).
243. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (holding that
the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus because the
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courts to arrogate to themselves the power to create novel aspects of
substantive law applicable in both federal and state courts. That sort
of atextualism must be backed by a very strong substantive value;245
yet, for the reasons discussed above, no such value applies here.
Professor Morley’s proposal also appears to collapse the distinction between jurisdiction and merits in arbitrary ways, violating the
second structural principle outlined above. Because Article III standing is a jurisdictional requirement only applicable in federal court, the
only way a court could read it into statutory text would be by deeming
it to be element of the cause of action on the merits. That elision obscures important questions about the practical effects of his proposal.
For example: If the canon of constitutional avoidance causes us to read
Article III standing into the elements of a statutory cause of action, can
the element then be waived if it is not duly raised in defense? Must a
state court raise the issue sua sponte, as a federal court must?
3. Federal Common Law
Nor can federal common law justify constraining state court
standing. Not only does federal common law lack the legitimacy of a
textual statutory license for applying federal standing doctrine in state
courts—violating the principle of legislative supremacy—but its limited enclave also lacks the sweep to do the job.246 The so-called “reverse-Erie doctrine” is the notion that certain procedural rules, such
as the right to a jury trial under the Federal Employers Liability Act,
are essential to the federal statutory right, and therefore state courts
must apply them when adjudicating that right.247 And while some
Judiciary Act of 1789, which granted such authority, violated Article III of the Constitution). But cf. id. at 180 (establishing that the federal judiciary’s power to declare acts
of Congress void was unconstitutional).
245. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 531, 537 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (“Substantive canons are presumptions, clear statement rules, or even super-strong clear statement rules that reflect judicial value judgments drawn from the common law and from constitutional law (created by judges), as well as from statutes themselves (as understood and interpreted by
judges).”).
246. See Alexander Volokh, Judicial Non-Delegation, the Inherent-Powers Corollary,
and Federal Common Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 1391, 1420 (2017) (“Federal courts generally
lack the power to make substantive rules of decision in diversity cases where, were the
case brought in state court, a rule of state law would apply.”).
247. See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361
(1952) (“[T]o deprive railroad workers of the benefit of a jury trial where there is evidence to support negligence ‘is to take away a goodly portion of the relief which Congress has afforded them.’” (quoting Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry. Co., 319 U.S. 350, 354
(1943))); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 218 (5th ed. 2007) (“If the
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have suggested that federal standing law qualifies for reverse-Erie
treatment,248 the case is flimsy.249 The reverse-Erie doctrine requires
clear statutory intent to require a given procedure; absent such intent,
the state court should follow its own rules so long as they do not discriminate against the federal right.250 Here, we see no clear statutory
intent and no burdening of the federal right. Indeed, applying federal
standing doctrine to federal questions would itself burden the federal
right.
4. State Law
Finally, we could seek to persuade state courts to follow federal
standing doctrine as a matter of state law. Indeed, many defendants
do just that.251 But state courts are embedded in different systems of
separated powers governed by different constitutional texts and different structural considerations.252 Many state courts might rightly
wonder why they must change their jurisdiction to accommodate increasingly restrictive federal jurisdiction. The normative bite of the
appeal therefore violates the second structural principle outlined
above: the distinct sovereignty of states and their concomitant power
to organize their sovereignty as they see fit.
And as a practical matter, appeals to state law will be merely
precatory, because the content of state law is determined by state legislatures and courts. And in large part, they have already spoken on
the issue—which is how we got the kaleidoscope of state standing illustrated in Part I. So long as some state courts decline the invitation
to apply federal standing doctrine as a matter of state law—as the map
at Figure 1 in Part II shows they do—a merely prudential appeal will
be necessarily incomplete.
C. PERMIT SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF ALL STATE JUDGMENTS INVOLVING
FEDERAL QUESTIONS
Matthew Hall has suggested that we restore the original appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to include “all state court judgments
federal law expressly specifies the procedures to be used with regard to a particular
cause of action, then, of course, states must follow it.”).
248. See Katz, supra note 9, at 1340–49.
249. See Hall, supra note 9, at 1288–89 (rejecting this notion).
250. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 247, at 219.
251. See discussion supra Part III.A; see also discussion supra Part II.B.
252. See Hershkoff, supra note 14, at 1882–98 (noting the differences across various states’ separation-of-powers systems over time, particularly as compared to the
federal government).
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regarding a claimed federal right.”253 In other words, reverse Doremus
and do away with standing as a limitation on the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction while retaining it for lower federal courts. Such a
resolution would solve the asymmetry of Supreme Court review of
state court judgments involving federal law.254 If the vice of the paradox at issue is a lack of uniformity of federal law (rather than the other
costs catalogued in Section II.B above), and if Supreme Court review
is an effective means to ensure such uniformity, this solution would
seem to do the trick.
But Spokeo changed the calculus.255 In particular, creating symmetrical Supreme Court review would do nothing to remedy the problem that arose only in the wake of Spokeo: exclusive state court jurisdiction over a distinct and persistent class of federal claims. Before
Spokeo, the problem of certain plaintiffs being limited to suing in state
court posed minimal risk to the uniformity of federal law because federal courts, including lower federal courts, could issue definitive interpretations of such law in cases brought by plaintiffs who had standing.256 Because Spokeo creates a class of claims, not plaintiffs, that are
barred from federal court, federal district and circuit courts would
never have a chance to opine on the elements of, say, a credit card receipt FACTA claim.
As a result, restoring the symmetry of Supreme Court appellate
review of state court judgments concerning federal law works as a solution only insomuch as the Supreme Court takes enough cases to ensure uniformity. Yet for all the reasons discussed above, there are
sharp limits on the Supreme Court’s ability to discipline even lower
federal courts into uniform application of federal law.257 There is little
reason to think they would fare better in disciplining state courts.

253. Hall, supra note 9, at 1291.
254. See supra Part II.A (discussing this asymmetry).
255. Professor Hall’s article predates the Spokeo decision.
256. Whether state courts should be bound by federal-court interpretations of federal law is a matter of state law. The substantial majority of states have held that state
courts are not bound by federal-court interpretations of federal law. See Hall v. Pa. Bd.
of Prob. & Parole, 851 A.2d 859, 863–64 (Pa. 2004) (cataloguing how state supreme
courts treat federal courts’ interpretations of federal law). Connecticut and Maine give
deference to such interpretations issued by courts in their respective circuits. See id. at
864. “Mississippi and New Hampshire hold that they are constrained by the interpretations of federal law forwarded by the Fifth and First Circuits, respectively.” Id. But
even state courts that are not strictly bound by lower federal courts’ interpretations of
federal law will find such interpretations persuasive. Id. at 863.
257. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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D. TREAT ALL VIOLATIONS OF STATUTORY RIGHTS AS ARTICLE III INJURIES
Given this doctrinal rat’s nest, it might be tempting to abrogate
federal standing doctrine root and branch or at least to allow Congress
to specify that any procedural statutory violation would automatically
confer Article III standing. Many law professors have taken that
view.258 But as the Supreme Court has gone further down the road of
developing the Article III injury requirement, the costs of doing so
have become clearer and more acute. First, doing so would mean overruling almost three decades of precedent—precedent that has been
cited, relied on, and developed not only by federal courts but also by
state courts.259 For that reason, liberalizing federal standing law at
this point risks creating the opposite paradox: state law claims that
can be brought only in federal court.
Second, and more structurally, Article III standing doctrine is a
constitutional limitation on the power of federal courts. It represents
a “constitutional minimum” that is “irreducible” by Congress or any
other political actor.260 Any steps to overrule Lujan and all of its progeny therefore requires a change of heart—or of personnel—on the
part of the Supreme Court. As a practical matter, such a change seems
unlikely given the current composition of the Supreme Court. After all,
even Spokeo was decided 6–2 by an eight-member Court, and no one
on the Court has expressed an inclination or desire to revisit Lujan.261
Even if one is skeptical of the separation-of-powers values ostensibly animating standing doctrine, we must recognize that such a judgment reflects a desire to trade off one structural value—the separation of powers—for others, such as legislative supremacy. There can
be no disagreement that allowing unlimited citizen suits in federal
court would require denying the importance of the separation-ofpowers concerns proffered by courts and scholars in justifying Article

258. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 30, at 54 (arguing for the permissibility of congressional grants of standing); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who
and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1371 (1973) (arguing that Congress can authorize federal
courts to interpret the Constitution regardless of whether private interests are at
stake); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1141, 1154–60 (1993) (arguing that Article III does not limit Congress’s power to
confer standing).
259. See discussion supra Parts I.C–D (illustrating how state courts have adopted
Lujan and its progeny).
260. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
261. The only dissenters in Lujan were Justices Blackmun and O’Connor; the only
member of the Lujan Court still on the bench is Justice Thomas.
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III standing.262 That denial itself reflects a tradeoff among competing
structural jurisdiction values.
Nor is such a tradeoff a costless one. Although the exact linkages
between Article III standing and the separation of powers are
murky,263 some exercises of judicial power obviously undermine the
power of coordinate branches, which is just to say that some wolves
come as wolves.264 Permitting generalized citizen suits to challenge
the legality of any government action would threaten to create a judicial veto over every statute, repeal, regulation, or alleged dereliction
of duty.265 Particularly when combined with the tendency of the federal district courts to issue so-called “nationwide” or universal injunctions against the government,266 that possibility threatens to accelerate the judicialization of American politics and overwhelm federal
courts with perpetual quasi-legislative functions.
There is thus a strong reason to retain at least as much of standing doctrine as can be said to promote a properly narrow role for the
judiciary, the third structural principle outlined above. But that core,
which prevents the problem of the generalized judicial veto over governmental action, is the particularization requirement. In Lujan, the
problem with the plaintiffs’ case for standing was that they could not
prove they had any intent to return to the endangered species’

262. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997) (“[T]he law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.” (quoting Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984))); see also Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S.
149, 157 (2014) (“The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.” (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408
(2013))).
263. For example, while Heather Elliott has identified “[a]t least three” ways in
which standing enforces the separation of powers, F. Andrew Hessick has identified
four other separation-of-powers purposes served by standing doctrine. See Elliott, supra note 206; Hessick, supra note 206.
264. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Frequently an issue of this sort will come before the Court clad, so to speak, in sheep’s
clothing: the potential of the asserted principle to effect important change in the equilibrium of power is not immediately evident, and must be discerned by a careful and
perceptive analysis. But this wolf comes as a wolf.”).
265. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894–97 (1983).
266. See Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065,
1067 (2018); Samuel Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction,
131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 418 (2017). But cf. Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920, 924 (2020) (arguing that, contrary to recent
scholarship, such injunctions are not novel).

1266

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:1211

habitats at issue.267 They might as well have been anyone. And while
such a lack of particularization necessarily implied a lack of concrete
injury, it was the particularization requirement that was doing the
work. So too in Warth v. Seldin; Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.; Los Angeles v. Lyons; Allen v. Wright; and Clapper v. Amnesty International USA.268 For
that reason, the particularization requirement—or some version of
it—is necessary to promote the separation-of-powers values at the
core of federal standing law.269
E. ELIMINATE CONCRETENESS AS A SEPARATE DIMENSION OF ARTICLE III
INJURY
Having determined that particularization has its uses, we must
subject concreteness to the same analysis. As we have seen, Spokeo’s
doctrinal emphasis on concreteness was new. After all, not even Judge
O’Scannlain, writing for the Ninth Circuit panel in Spokeo, conceived
of concreteness as imposing additional requirements beyond that of
an alleged statutory violation.270 And the wave of lower-court dismissals of federal statutory class actions in the wake of Spokeo strongly
implies that the case moved the law of standing substantially.271
We have also seen how concreteness is the key driver of the paradox. Whereas pre-Spokeo standing law combined with variable state
standing law creates a class of plaintiffs shut out of federal court,
Spokeo creates a class of federal claims shut out of federal court and
relegated to the exclusive jurisdiction of state courts—if anywhere.
Before Spokeo, the potential cost was felt by individual plaintiffs. Now
it is felt by the soundness and uniformity of entire sections of the
United States Code.272
267. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1991) (“Such ‘some day’ intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification
of when the some day will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.”).
268. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982); City of L.A. v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95 (1983); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
568 U.S. 398 (2013).
269. See, e.g., William Baude, Standing in the Shadow of Congress, 2016 SUP. CT. REV.
197, 230–31 (2017) (proposing two readings of Justice Thomas’s concurrence in
Spokeo, the more permissive reading of which would focus on particularization and
reduce it to personalization).
270. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 2014).
271. See supra Part I.C.
272. Zachary Clopton has argued that the paradox is no serious problem, and that
instead we should view its existence as an “invitation[] to legislators to consider other
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Eliminating the concreteness requirement, or at least considering
it satisfied by procedural statutory violations—while retaining the
particularization requirement—is the only way to untie the Gordian
knot. First, as noted, it retains the separation-of-powers protections
that have animated standing doctrine’s development. Second, it ensures that every statutory violation can be vindicated by at least one
plaintiff: the one who feels the harm most sharply. Third, it respects
the principle of legislative supremacy, allowing Congress to specify
federal injuries that can be redressed in any court of general jurisdiction, including federal courts. Fourth, it respects the separate sovereignty of states and their judiciaries, allowing them to set their own
jurisdictional rules. And it achieves all those goals without requiring
any novel interpretation of Article III’s text or history.
Of course, despite its advantages over alternative proposed remedies, eliminating the concreteness requirement is not a complete fix.
There will still be plaintiffs who can bring federal claims in state court
that they could not have brought in federal court. And Supreme Court
review of those cases will be asymmetrical absent reversal of Doremus. But eliminating the concreteness requirement lowers the stakes
for both problems, and it does not preclude reversal of Doremus.
In practical terms, eliminating the concreteness requirement demands overruling Spokeo. As explained above, Spokeo necessarily held
that concreteness is a distinct doctrinal category and that the Ninth
Circuit erred in failing to analyze it separately. Any attempt to collapse
concreteness back into particularization must therefore confront the
holding in Spokeo. Against this idea, William Baude has argued that
treating concreteness as satisfied by particularized injuries fits with a
more “permissive” reading of Justice Thomas’s concurrence in

pathways for adjudication.” Clopton, Justiciability, supra note 9, at 1432. In part, that is
because he tells a story in which Congress affirmatively chooses to create statutory
rights that are unenforceable in federal court because of Article III. See id. at 1465–67
(theorizing why states might create more liberal standing for federal rights, and why
Congress might continue to create rights that can only be enforced in some state
courts). Of course, as an historical matter, the novel jurisdictional limitation imposed
by Spokeo and its progeny postdate the creation of dozens of statutory causes of action
subject to the paradox. See FARHANG, supra note 15, at 63 (discussing the growth of
private enforcement schemes to achieve a regulatory purpose). For that reason, Clopton’s framing of the issue is misleading. And even if that were not the case—for example, if Congress continued to create federal statutory-damages actions in the face of an
increasingly robust concreteness requirement—the idea that federal courts’ refusal to
entertain otherwise meritorious federal claims is somehow a friendly invitation to its
coordinate branch to imagine a different remedial forum is an odd recasting of interbranch hardball.
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Spokeo.273 Justice Thomas reasoned that, as much as the FCRA created
“a private duty owed personally to Robins to protect his information,”
that would be enough for purposes of Article III.274 Yet Baude’s attempt to read Spokeo permissively seems inconsistent with the
Court’s disposition in the case: vacatur and remand for consideration
of the concreteness prong of Article III injury.275 Indeed, Baude’s admission of the similarity between such an approach and Judge
O’Scannlain’s reveals the inconsistency between it and the Spokeo majority.276 For that reason, Baude disclaims the necessity of overruling
the holding in Spokeo, silently or otherwise, to remedy the decision’s
true costs. Perhaps because his focus, like the Court’s, is on litigation
solely in federal court, those costs were not readily apparent. Yet, as
this Article has catalogued, those costs are significant, and they are
best addressed by overruling Spokeo while retaining the requirement
of particularization.
CONCLUSION
The paradox of exclusive state court jurisdiction over certain federal claims is a mirror of our procedural values in fashioning a judicial
system that accommodates both federalism and the separation of
powers. The difficulty of resolving it cleanly reveals the tensions in the
structure of judicial federalism. Recent Supreme Court caselaw, embodied most prominently in Spokeo, threatens to exacerbate the paradox and push the tradeoffs its solutions require to the fore. Working
through these tensions and compromises now promises the possibility of avoiding inadvertent doctrinal acceleration of the paradox’s
costs.

273. See Baude, supra note 269, at 231.
274. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1554 (2016).
275. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that Justice Thomas’s opinion was a concurrence, not the majority opinion, and his vote was not even pivotal given the six votes
for the majority opinion. See Thomas B. Bennett, Barry Friedman, Andrew D. Martin &
Susan Navarro Smelcer, Divide & Concur: Separate Opinions and Legal Change, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 847 (2018).
276. Baude, supra note 269, at 231.

